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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION
-andJONATHAN LOGAN, INC.

i
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union
AFL-CIO

OPINION
and
AWARD

and
Jonathan Logan, Inc. (Butte Knitting Mills

Div.)

The stipulated issue is:
Should the affected employees then classified
as Sample Sewers have lost their seniority as
of December 15, 1983? If so what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held in Spartanburg, South Carolina, on
October 16, 1984 at which time the "affected employees," hereinafter referred to as the "grievants" and representatives of
the above named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived; the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
Because of the precipitate nature of the essential actions
giving rise to the grievance in this case, and the evident confusion as a result among the affected employees, I conclude that
this matter warrants a determination based on the particular
facts and circumstances present.

Therefore this decision is

applicable only to this grievance and shall not be construed as
an interpretation of the contract for any subsequent matter.

-2I find that when the eleven grLevants who had been on
layoff from the sample room, returned to active employment in
the Sewing Department, they believed and/or had reasonable grounds
to believe that their acceptance of the available but different
jobs in the Sewing Department was "at the Employer's request"
and was not their voluntary choice.
I conclude that under the apparent pressure to make an
immediate decision to accept the Sewing Department production
job or to remain on layoff, it was not made adequately clear to
the grievants that their seasonal layoff status had been transformed into an "indefinite layoff" due to the Company's decision
to permanently reduce the staff of the Sample Room.

(Indeed, the

record supports the view that for the grievants or many of them,
the change from a seasonal layoff to a permanent layoff was not
made known to them until the offer of Sewing Department jobs was
made.) Consequently, I am not satisfied that the grievants fully
understood or had proper notice that because of their changed
layoff status, an acceptance of a Sewing Department job would be
deemed by the Company as a voluntary choice, and that it would
result in a seniority status for future layoffs as if they were
new hires.

Yet they were required by the Company to decide

virtually forthwith on acceptance or rejection of the Sewing
Department jobs.
Considering the experience of some of the grievants in
1968, 1975 and 1981 when they and other employees retained their
accumulated seniority

when transferred to or returned to active

-3employment in different jobs or departments after longer periods
of layoff, and considering the "eleventh hour" change in their
original layoff status from seasonal to indefinite, it does not
surprise me that the grievants thought the instant circumstance
to be the same as in those prior years; that they would retain
their accumulated seniority and that the recall to jobs in the
Sewing Department was at the Company's request.
The confusion was evidenced and compounded by Company
statements to the grievants to the effect that they accept the
Sewing Department jobs or "lose their seniority" or "lose their
employment."

Faced with such an ambiguous statement and the re-

quirement to decide immediately because they "were needed the
next day" it is not illogical for the grievants to think that the
way to retain their accumulated seniority would be to take the
jobs offered by the Company and that the Company was requesting
that they do so.

In short, I do not think that the Company afford-

ed the grievants a full and fair opportunity to understand the
import and consequences of the choice they were to make or to give
them a chance to make a reasoned voluntary decision.
Applying these facts to the contract, I find a sound,
reasonable and fair basis to hold that what happened should fall
more properly within Paragraph 9 of the Supplemental Agreement
entitled "Seniority", then under Article XXIII(4) of the contract.
That being so, the circumstances here should be deemed a transfer
"at the Employer's request.0." within the meaning of Paragraph 9
of the Supplemental Agreement; and the grievants should have

-4retained their seniority when they accepted and were placed in
the Sewing Department.
As I do not find that the Company violated the contract,
but rather that the grievants were not adequately informed of
the facts and their rights (or lack of rights), I shall confine
the remedy to restoration of seniority.
Claims for retroactive damages, if any, are denied.

How-

ever, any grievant since laid off from the Sewing Department
because of the wrong seniority shall be restored to active employ
ment in the Department if her correct seniority supports that
entitlement.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Impartial Chairman
under the collective bargaining agreement between the above named
parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The affected employees then classified as
Sample Sewers shall not have lost their
seniority as of December 15, 1983. They
should have retained their seniority when
they accepted and were placed in production
jobs in the Sewing Department. Their seniority shall be restored and their present and
future employment in the Sewing Department
shall be based on that seniority0

DATED: January 29, 1985
STATE OF New York )ss. :
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union

AWARD

and
Jonathan Logan, Inc. (Misty Harbor)

The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named Union and Company
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Union
and Company, makes the following AWARD:
In resolution of all claims submitted to
this Arbitration the Company shall pay
to the following persons the amount of
money indicated:
James Glenn
William Harrison
Charles Perry
Arrie Black
James Vickers
George Oberg
Barbara Taylor
Caroline Blue
James Crawford
Gertrudis Byrd
Angela Balarezo
Israel Imel
Joyce Johnson
Jacqueline Phillips
Shirley Dowdy
John Aguiar
Lucy Schuyler
Cornelia Braxton
Edith Hynson
Herman Rifkind
Lillie Street
Patricia Walker
••
Marie Powell
Deanna Alexander
Rafael Serrano
Kimberly Preston
Keith Rogers

DATED: March 4, 1985
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) s s - :

$4,410
4,165
4,165
3,920
3,675
3,675
3,430
3,430
3,430
3,185
2.940
2,450
2,450
2,450
2 ,450
2 ,205
1 ,960
1 ,960
1 ,715
1,715
1,470
980

a**
245
245
245
245
245

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union

AWARD

and
Jonathan Logan, Inc. (Misty Harbor)
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named Union and Company
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Union
and Company, makes the following AWARD:
In resolution of all claims submitted to
this Arbitration, the Company shall pay
to the following persons the amount of
money indicated:
James Glenn
William Harrison
Charles Perry
Arrie Black
James Vickers
George Oberg
Barbara Taylor
Caroline Blue
James Crawford
Gertrudis Byrd
Angela Balarezo
Israel Imel
Joyce Johnson
Jacqueline Phillips
Shirley Dowdy
John Aguiar
Lucy Schuyler
Cornelia Braxton
Edith Hynson
Herman Rifkind
Lillie Street
Patricia Walker
Marie Powell
Deanna Alexander
Rafael Serrano
Kimberly Preston
Keith Rogers

DATED: March 24, 1985
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss

$4,410
4,165
4,165
3,920
3,675
3,675
3 ,430
3 ,430
3 ,430
3 ,185
2 ,940
2 ,450
2 ,450
2 ,450
2 ,450
2 ,205
1 ,960
1 ,960
1 ,715
1,715
1,470
980
245
245
245
245
245

Eric J/f Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union

AWARD

and
Jonathan Logan, Incorporated
(Modern Juniors)

In accordance with Article XLII of the collective bargaining agreement between the above named Union and Company the
Undersigned, designated as the Arbitrator, held a hearing on
June 4, 1984 in New York, New York on the Union's claims on behalf of certain employees for severance pay, length of service
payments and holiday payment resulting from the shut-down of the
Company's Modern Juniors Division.

The Company thereafter closed

its Andrew Knit, Margaret Fashions, Chambersburg and Aero Knit
plants.

The parties have agreed that the decision in this matter

shall apply to the Union's claims on behalf of employees in these
plants for severance pay, length of service payments and holiday
pay.
Having considered the entire record before me, I make the
following AWARD:
1.

Severance Pay
The Union's claim for severance pay
is denied.

2.

The Union's claim for length of service
payments is granted as follows:
a. In accordance with the terms of the
applicable supplemental agreement effective June 1, 1982 the Company shall make
contributions to the Health and Welfare
Fund of 2% of the payroll of all employees
who have been terminated in the calendar
year 1984 or 1985, where applicable, in
connection with the shut-down of a plant
or facility, and who, but for such terminationwould have been employed three or
more years on December 1, 1984 or December
1, 1985, where applicable.

-2-

3.

Holiday Pay
The Union's claim for holiday pay is
granted as follows:
a. Under Article XXII, Section 2b of
the Master Agreement the Company shall
grant to the employees holiday pay for
all paid holidays which have occurred
or will occur within ninety (90) days
following the last day of work of said
employees.

4.

In full response to all the Union's
claims in this matter, the foregoing
Awards 1 through 3 shall apply to employees of the Company's plants referred
to in the first paragraph herein and who
are terminated in calendar year 1984 or
1985, where applicable, in connection with
the shut-down of a plant or facility, provided such termination was neither voluntary
nor for good and sufficient cause and provided further that such terminated employee is
not and has not been offered other permanent
employment with the Company.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: April 17, 1985
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )So
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION
-and- JONATHAN LOGAN, INC.
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Jonathan Logan, Inc.
(Misty Harbor Ltd. Division)
The stipulated issue is:
Whether Sharon Barnes was properly laid
off from March 1, 1985 to June 3, 1985?
If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Baltimore, Maryland on July 22, 1985
at which time Ms. Barnes, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
tor*s Oath was waived.

The Arbitra-

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.

The Union contends that the grievant1s layoff from the job
of bagger was improper because at the time she should have been
credited with the most seniority in that classification; that contrary to earlier assurances that she would be "the most senior
bagger" two other employees were later, retroactively, but wrongly
accorded greater seniority (and thereby retained at work when the
grievant was laid off).

That on other occasions the Company used

plant-wide seniority for layoffs and that that procedure should
have applied in the instant layoff, permitting the grievant to
bump at least three junior employees in other classifications; and
that shortly before the grievants' layoff, a junior employee was
transferred from bagger to checker, "fortuitously" and wrongfully
designed to "save" that employee from the layoff which, as a
consequence and otherwise hit the grievant.

-2-

I do not dispute the Union's assertion that plant-wide
seniority is the "most equitable way" to deal with the layoff and
recalls to cover diminishing available work.

If and so

long as

the parties, by joint agreement, or without Union objection utilize
that method, no complaint would arise and the arrangement would
not be actionable as inconsistant with the contract.

But I do not

find that a practice was or has been established which would work
to change the specific contract provision that layoffs are based
on seniority within the classification affected.
Section 10(b) of the applicable Supplemental Agreement provides in pertinent part:
Layoff and recall
Employees shall be laid off by seniority
within each classification...
Absent the joint agreement of the parties otherwise, or
circumstances where mutual agreement may be reasonably construed
from their conduct, the Arbitrator is bound to the foregoing contract language.

I find no mutual variations of that language in

this case and no long standing, consistent contrary practice which
would negate its effectiveness.

Therefore the Union's claim that

there were other junior employees in other classifications who
should have been laid off before the grievant, cannot be supported.
In the instant case, the grievant was the junior employee
with seniority in the bagger classification at the time of her
layoff.

I cannot conclude that two other employees were wrong-

fully accorded greater and retroactive seniority in that classification, because I find that the facts leading to that arrangement were initiated by the Union, and the arrangement itself was
known to or should have been known to both the Union and the grievant, and neither objected.

In short, I find that the Union and

the grievant are estopped in this arbitration from complaining

-3-

about the Company's action, which, earlier, classified the two
other employees as baggers, and gave them seniority in that
classification superior to the grievant.
The facts concerning those two employees, Stewardie Bennett
and Mary McKenzie, are clear.

On their behalf the Union complained

that though classified as examiners, they were performing in the
higher bagger classification.

As a result of that complaint by

the Union, the Company reclassified them as baggers, increased
their pay to the bagger rate prospectively, and accorded them
seniority in the bagger classification, retroactive, presumably,
to the date they began performing bagger duties.
One can question whether there is a proper consistency between increasing their pay prospectively and according classification seniority retroactively, but that question is no longer relevant or determinative.

The fact is that I am persuaded that in

response to its complaint on behalf of Bennett and McKenzie, the
Union knew or should have known of the resolution of that complaint
--the reclassification, the pay increase, and the retroactive
classification seniority.

With that knowledge, actual or construct-

tive, the Union cannot now protest the layoff consequences, of
that seniority arrangement.
I am also satisfied that because of another circumstance
the grievant and the Union knew of the greater classification
seniority accorded Bennett and McKenzie.

An earlier but short

layoff in the bagger classification but after the aforesaid arrangement, affected the grievant who was laid off a day or two
but did not affect the other two employees.
nor the grievant complained then.

Neither the Union

No matter the reasons now

advanced for not grieving, I must conclude that the failure to do
so was based on a knowledge or recognition that the grievant no
longer enjoyed top bagger seniority.

-4-

There is insufficient evidence to support the Union's claim
that the transfer of Amelia Mathias from bagger to checker was designed to protect Mathias from the upcoming, instant layoff.

The

uncontroverted evidence established that Mathias was not "transferred" but rather "claimed" the checker job under Section 10(a)
of the Supplemental Agreement.
award of the

There is no evidence that the

job to her under Section 10(a) was other than in

accordance with her contract right to claim that open job and in
accordance with her qualifications and seniority.
I do not find support in the record for the balance of the
Union's arguments - namely claims that Article XVIII 1|1, Article
XXIII 115, Article XXV 1(1 and Article XXVI 1|1 were violated.

Spe-

cifically I do not find that the available work was not "distributed...as equally and equitably as possible."

The layoff took

place because there was not enough bagger work to sustain all the
employees of that classification.

There was no probative showing

that the grievant was denied a "temporary job opening," or indeed
if there were any such openings available.
was not a discharge or discipline.

Clearly her layoff

And finally, her layoff had

nothing to do with the maintenance of "wages, piece rates, standards and working conditions."

Those matters are subject to the

Company's express contract and managerial right to reduce the work
force to correspond to the quantity of available work.
The Undersign, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
Sharon Barnes was properly laid off from
March 1, 1985 to June 3, 1985.

DATED: September 16, 1985

—

STATE OF PNew York

ArbJtrito?

COUNTY OF New York

)ss .

)SS"

=-r

ArOitrator

—
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I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
As Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union
OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Jonathan Logan, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Michael Jones? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on September 19, 1985 in Baltimore,
Maryland at which time Mr. Jones, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and
Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

I find that the Company did not follow the prescribed
disciplinary procedures and steps of its Personnel Policies and
Procedures (Policy No. 15.0106) but that that failure is not
controlling in this case.
I further find that on May 31, 1985 when the grievant was
discharged for excessive absenteeism, the Company had grounds for
the discharge, but failed to effectuate the discharge definitively
or effectively.
That the Company did not issue the warnings

(and a suspen-

sion) pursuant to the sequence of Policy No. 15.010 is immaterial.
The Policy was preempted and changed in this instance by the agreement of the Union and Company in January 1985 to give the grievant
a "final warning" and a "last chance."

Hence though his excessive

absentee record in January 1985 may have warranted a de novo resumption of the progressive discipline cycle with a "first warning"
following the earlier warnings of February and April 1984, (both
of which would have been expunged by the Company's acknowledged

-2-

practice of doing so after six months), the agreement of January
1985 that the "grievant's next attendance infraction would result
in his discharge" constituted a bi-lateral change in the warning
procedure, and is the enforceable understanding that prevails in
this particular case.
There is no question about the grievant's record of excessive absenteeism.

It has been documented in the record and

the Company has met its burden of showing its unsatisfactory
nature.

Therefore, pursuant to the special arrangement of January

1985, the grievant's attendance record as of May 31, 1985, especially the last three days of his employment when he did not show
up for work or reported to the wrong location, constituted a
"next attendance infraction" warranting dismissal.
But the Company, for whatever reason, did not discharge him
upon that "infraction."

Instead it told him that he "could not

return to work without a doctor's excuse."

That meant not that

he was fired, but rather he could return to work with a doctor's
statement or excuse.

He was not told that he was fired because

he did not produce a doctor's statement, but that he couldn't work
without one.

Implicit, to my mind, was the condition that if he

produced a doctor's note, he'd be able to return to work, especially
when he was not told that the opportunity to obtain a note was
foreclosed or that it was too late to do so.
how much time he had to obtain the statement.

Also, he was not told
So impliedly, he

had reason to believe that he had a reasonable time to do so.

He

produced a doctor's statement within two days, which I deem to be
a reasonable time.

There is no probative evidence that the note

or its substance were false.
Under this circumstance, the Company gave the grievant the
right to return to work if he produced a doctor's excuse, even

-3-

though the Company had the right to discharge him.

The right was

thereby waived, and the Company's subsequent effort to exercise
it is nullified.
However, I find no basis to return the grievant to work with
back pay.

Considering his poor attendance record, I do not know

how many of the days since his discharge he would have worked,
or whether, if his absentee record continued, he

might not have

been subsequently suspended or terminated, under the Company's
Personnel Policies and Procedures.
I am persuaded that a suspension is the fair and equitable
measure of damages and remedy under the specific facts of this
case, particularly in view of the modifications in the warning
procedure agreed to by the parties in January 1985.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Michael Jones was not for
just cause. He shall be reinstated but
without back pay. The period between his
discharge and his reinstatement shall be
deemed a disciplinary suspension for excessive
absenteeism.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: October 15, 1985
STATE OF New York ss . :
COUNTY OF New York
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union
AWARD

and
Jonathan Logan, Incorporated
(Act III Division)
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named Union and Company
and having duly heard the proofs and arguments of said parties
at hearings on September 4 and October 15, 1985 makes the following AWARD:
The Company's close down of the Act III
Division did not violate the contract.
The manner by which whatever remaining
work is handled does not violate the
contract.
The benefits to which the affected employees are entitled are the same as set
forth in my Award of April 17, 1985,
International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union -and- Jonathan Logan, Incorporated
(Modern Juniors) .
The Company is directed to accord said
benefits to said affected employees.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: November 11, 1985
STATE OF New York ) ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 1049, International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 1730 0185 84

and
The Long Island Lighting Company

In accordance with Article XVII of the collective bargaining agreement dated July 1, 1982 between the above-named Union
and Employer, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator
to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Was the discharge of Edward Holsey for
iust cause? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the Employer in
Hicksville, New York on January 4, 1985 at which time representatives of the Union and Employer appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The grievant attended the hearing.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

A stenographic record was

taken.
BACKGROUND
The grievant, Edward Holsey, began working for the Company
on June 19, 1978 in the Building Operations Department.

He

exercised his seniority rights on several occasions that enabled
him to receive lateral transfers to different locations of the
Company.

He most recently served as a Building Attendant at

Brentwood where he worked from 4:00 P.M. to 12:30 A.M., performing janitorial duties along with six other persons.

-9-

The grievant received two written reprimands for poor
attendance dated September 25, 1979 and April 10, 1980.

He

received three suspensions for poor attendance: a one-day suspension on June 16, 1981; a three-day suspension on May 27,
May 28, and June 1, 1982; and a five-day suspension and final
notice in December 1982.

He also received a verbal reprimand

on December 21, 1983 for poor performance.

No grievances were

filed regarding any of these disciplinary actions.
In 1983, the grievant took four emergency vacation days
(i.e. unscheduled vacation days), thirteen sick days (as a result
of seven occurrences that included four separate % days contiguous to a weekend), and two incidents of lateness.
paid for being late on March 14, 1983.

In 1984,

He was not
the grievant

took an emergency vacation day on January 9, a floating holiday
on January 16, and was denied a request for an emergency vacation
day on January 24 which he took as an absence without pay.

The

grievant took five sick days from February 1 to February 7 during which time he worked at his part-time job as a Hall Monitor
for the Amityville Union Free School District on two of the days.
The Employer suspended the grievant beginning February 23, 1984.
On March 2, the Employer converted the suspension into a termination .
Article XI of the collective bargaining agreement, provides
for sick leave for 25 days full pay and 25 days half pay.

The

parties stipulated that the bona fides of the illnesses of the
grievant are not in dispute and there is no dispute regarding
medical documentation for such absences.
CONTENTIONS OF THE EMPLOYER
The Employer asserts that it discharged the grievant for

-3a severe pattern of absenteeism that did not change or improve
since he began working on June 19, 1978.

The Employer claims

that it followed progressive discipline that included efforts to
rehabilitate, counsel, and educate the grievant so that he would
report to work regularly.

The Employer maintains that though it

also imposed written reprimands and three suspensions for unacceptable attendance, the grievant's pattern of repeated short
absences continued.

It notes that the grievant and the Union did

not contest these disciplinary actions.
In the opinion of the Employer, the grievant's record
worsened in early 1984 insofar as he took two emergency vacation
days after a scheduled vacation in early January and another
emergency vacation day in late January, and five sick days on
the work days between February 1 and February 7.

It points to

the fact that the grievant worked at a part-time job on February
6 and February 7 as evidence that the grievant did not recognize
.
his obligation to maintain a regular attendance record with the
Employer.

The Employer underscores its position that there is

no duty on its part to constantly make special requests of its
employees to attend work.

The Employer emphasizes that the re-

peated and unscheduled absences of the grievant adversely affect
the planning and productivity of the Building Operations Department .
CONTENTIONS OF THE UNION
The Union insists that the discharge is not for just cause
and seeks reinstatement for the grievant with backpay and benefits)
The Union maintains that the bulk of the grievant's absences were
medically related and frequently documented by a doctor's note.
In this regard, the Union stresses that the bona fides of the
absences are not disputed. The Union further relies upon the
medical treatment and counseling that the grievant received from

-4the Veterans Administration as an indication that the grievant
has sought to improve his record.
The Union argues that the grievant has had a second job
since the Employer first employed him.

This part-time job in

the Union's view never conflicted with his primary job.

The Unior

contends that the grievant worked at his part-time job in the
Amityville school system on February 6 and February 7 due to a
special request from the Assistant Principal of the school involved.

It is the claim of the Union that the nature of the

grievant's responsibilities as a hall monitor in the school enabled him to work there even though on the same days he was not
physically able to do the manual work involved in his position
with the Employer.

This distinction is cited by the Union as an

explanation for the grievant working in the school but calling
in sick to the Employer.

The Union reiterates that the grievant

worked at the part-time job only in response to the personal and
urgent request of the Assistant Principal after the grievant had
been sick for the first three work days of February.
The Union rejects the assertion of the Employer that an
inappropriate number of the absences surrounded weekends.

In

this regard, the Union points out that 40 percent of all workdays surround a weekend.

The Union requests that the grievant

be reinstated in light of the extensive psychiatric help he has
received from the Veterans Administration.
The Union insists that the grievant's record of 13 absences
in 1983 is not excessive.

Furthermore, the Union does not con-

sider 5% hours of personal time in 1983 to be excessive.

The

Union relies on the sick leave provision of the collective bargaining agreement as support for its argument that the grievant's
record does not constitute excessive absenteeism.

Thus the

Employer is precluded, in the Union's view, from claiming that

-5the sick leave record is excessive or that the emergency vacation
days that were granted and charged against the grievant's contractual vacation benefits somehow furnish a basis for disciplinary action.

Specifically, the Union challenges the Employer's

argument that because the average sick leave experience in the
Company is six or seven days per year, an employee with 13 sick
days is considered excessively absent.
OPINION
The parties stipulated that there is no claim that the
absences of the grievant were not bona fide.

Thus the claim

of the Employer that certain absences surrounded weekends or
scheduled vacation days is rejected as irrelevant.

Similarly,

the grievant should not be charged for emergency vacation days
that the Employer approved because such days, once approved, involved the exercise of a contractual benefit.

If the grievant's

use of such days posed a hardship for the Employer in terms of
planning and scheduling work, the Employer did not have to and
should not have approved those requests.
However, the foregoing notwithstanding

there are certain

well settled and well observed arbitral rules which are applicable to the facts in this case and dispositive of the issues.
One is that excessive absenteeism over an extended period
of time is grounds for progressive discipline even if the absences
are due to sickness or other reasons beyond the employee's control.
This rule is based on the equally well settled principle that an
employer, in order to maintain its schedules and perform its
services, is entitled to the prompt and regular attendance of its
employees.

If an employee is unable to meet this obligation, for

whatever reason, such an employee may be terminated in accordance
with the rules of progressive discipline.
Another is that a contract sick leave maximum is not what

-6an employee is permitted to take with impunity year-in and yearout, or as a regular characteristic of his work history.

Those

maximums (here 25 days at full pay and 25 days at half pay) are
intended to cover unusual periods of illness and unexpected disabilities, and are not licenses for that amount of absenteeism
on a regular basis each year.
It is undisputed that the Employer imposed reprimands and
suspensions for the grievant's poor attendance record between
1978 and 1982.

Inasmuch as those disciplinary actions were not

grieved, they are no longer contestable or rebuttable in this
proceeding.

Consequently, the issue before the Arbitrator narrows

to whether the grievant's record in 1983 and 1984 warranted
further discipline.
In view of this prior record, and the foregoing rules, the
grievant had a special duty to improve his record to a point
discernably better than the "average" and certainly better than
a quantity which, as here, significantly exceeded the average.
That the grievant's quantity of absences did not exceed the yearly
contract maximum is not a defense available to him in view of
his prior warnings and suspensions.

He had a duty to do better

than to continue a record which was on the high side of the
average range.
The record is clear that the grievant knew that his attendance record did not conform to the expectations of the Employer.
He sought counseling from the Veterans Administration that dealt,
in part, with this problem.

Notwithstanding this knowledge, the

grievant further failed in his duty by working at his part-time
job on February 6 and February 7. yet he called in sick to the
Employer.

His attempt to distinguish the nature of the work as

a hall monitor from his responsibilities at the Employer does not
excuse his conduct.

By working on February 6 and February 7 at

-7the school, the grievant decreased, if not precluded, the possibility that he would be able to work for the Employer those
days.

Even though the Employer does not dispute that the grie-

vant had the flu,

the priority that the grievant afforded the

part-time job compared to his job with the Employer was improper.
When the school principal urged him to attend work because his
mere presence would help maintain order in the hall, he should
have recognized his primary obligation to the Employer by rejecting the request.

He should have spent that time recuperating,

so as to speed his return to his primary job with the Employer.
The record also reflects that the grievant requested
January 24, 1984 as an emergency vacation day.

Although the

Employer denied this request, the grievant did not report for
work and the Employer did not pay him for that day.

This conduct

is also evidence of the grievant ! s failure to meet his duty to
improve his attendance record.
These actions by the grievant fell markedly short of his
obligations, and, irrespective of reasons, warrant discipline.
Added to his earlier, unchallenged disciplinary record convinces
me that the grievant's overall record properly triggered his
dismissal as the final and appropriate step in progressive
discipline.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Edward Holsey was for
just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
DATED: March ^/, 1985
Arbitrator
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) s s - I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration

Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
LIU Faculty Federation, Local 3998
NYSUT,

AFT,

AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1339 0496 85

and
Long Island University

The stipulated issue is:
Has the Employer violated the collective
bargaining agreement with respect to the
Overload/Adjunct compensation schedule?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the American Arbitration Association
on July 2, 1985 at xvhich time representatives of the Faculty
Federation, hereinafter

referred to as the "Union" and Long Island

University, hereinafter referred to as the "Employer" or the
"University" appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
I conclude that the Employer acted properly in increasing
the adjunct rates of pay effective February 15, 1985 but violated
the contract by failing to increase the overload compensation rates
for full-time faculty by the same amounts effective February, 1985.
With regard to the adjunct rates of pay, the contract is
clear and dispositive of that part of the issue.

Article XXX

Section 2 reads:
Adjunct Faculty
Section 2. The compensation and benefit schedule
for adjunct faculty shall be revised to reflect
any improvements resulting from any settlement
negotiated with the C.W. Post AFA.
The C. W. Post Adjunct Faculty Association-LIU contract provisdes for 15 increases for adjunct faculty effective February 1,
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1985 with a maximum cap of compensation at $450.
Consistent with the Post rates the Employer increased the
adjunct compensation for Instructors, Assistant Professors and
Associate Professors to $315, 365 and $415 respectively with no
increase in the Professor rate which was already at the $450
maximum.
rates.

The parties are not in disagreement over these increased
They disagree over when the new rate structure should have

been effective.

The Union claims the increases should have been

retroactive to September 1, 1983, the beginning date of the current
contract.

The University asserts that the February 1, 1985 date

is correct.
Section 2 as recited above, is a "me too" clause.

It calls

for precise parity between the Post contract and the instant contract covering the Brooklyn campus.

It is clear and unambiguous.

It calls for revision of the compensation schedule of the Brooklyn
campus adjunct faculty "to reflect any improvements resulting from
any settlement negotiationed with the C. W. Post AFA." The negotiated improvement was the respective $15 increases and its effective date of February 1, 1985.

For the wage increase to be granted

the Brooklyn adjunct faculty earlier, or retroactive to September
1, 1983, would be to accord an improvement obviously greater than
what the Employer negotiated with the Post AFA, and instead of
reflecting the latter improvements would substantially exceed them.
Section 2 grants and requires equality and precise comparability.

It does not fix a different effective date for salary

adjustments

for the adjunct faculty covered by the instait contract,

nor does any other part of the contract fix a different date.
Moreover, it is undisputed that in negotiating Section 2 and in the
contract negotiations generally, the parties did not agree on
retroactivity for adjunct compensation improvements or to a different effective date than what was agreed to at Post.
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That the Union may have agreed to the "me too" clause in
1983 because of the University's representation that it expected
to conclude a contract at Post shortly, is not enough to constitute
a promise of retroactivity or even to create an equitable basis for
that conclusion.

The Union took its chances.

It was not pro-

mised retroactivity; it was not guaranteed a quick settlement at
Post and it had ample opportunity

to negotiate a fixed dated for

the application of the Post rates for adjuncts when Section 2 was
accepted.

That it did not do so, and was not given any promise

or assurance of retroactivity leaves the parties bound to
unconditional and specific language of Section 2.

the

Under that

language the applicable improvements were the undisputed wage increases and perforce February 1, 1985 as the effective date.
With regard to the matter of overload compensation, the answer is not as clear.

It is undisputed that by the language of

Section 2, and by the facts, the University-C. W. Post AFA negotiations did not deal with overload compensation for either the
full-time faculty at Post, or the full-time faculty at the Brooklyn
campus.

The Post AFA unit did not

include full-time faculty;

hence no issue of overload compensation for full-time faculty was
included or within the juris diction of those negotiations.
over Section 2 speaks only of compensation and benefit

More-

schedules

for adjunct faculty; so that the "me too" clause applies only to
the Brooklyn campus adjuncts and not to the full-time faculty.
Hence Section 2 standing alone is not relevant to or dispositive
of the overload

issue.

But Article XXX Section 3(a) deals with adjunct rates of
compensation and overload rates.

And it is undisputed that the

schedule in 3(a) served two purposes.

It set forth the compen-

sation rates for adjunct faculty; and also the overload rates for
the full-time faculty.

Section 3(a)

reads:

-4Section 3.

Extra Workload Compensation

(a) Overload/Adjunct
Adjunct/overload teaching shall be compensated at the following rates:
Professors
Associate Professors
Assistant Professors
Instructors

$450
$400
$350
$300

Therein lies the ambiguity of Section 3(a).

The University

argues that with the C. W. Post AFA negotiations, the adjunct
compensation rates and the overload rate became divided and different.

The "me-too" provisions of Section 2 increased only the

adjunct compensation rates, but the existing schedule for overload
compensation remained the same.

The University argues that as the

Post contract had nothing to do with overload, and the overload
compensation

in the instant contract was negotiated in 1983 with

the Union at the schedule fixed in Section 3(a) no change or increase is warranted in the overload compensation.
University

Finally the

points out that its objective in both contract nego-

tiations was to establish or maintain economic parity between the
two campuses; that the overload rates at Post remained at the
levels set forth in Section 3(a); and therefore no change in those
levels should be accorded the Brooklyn campus full-time faculty.
.
But it can be argued with equal logic, as does the Union,
that under Section 3(a) adjunct compensation and overload are inseparable and synonymous.

The Union asserts and the University

concedes that throughout the 1983 negotiations of the instant
contract there was no discussion of differences between adjunct
compensation and overload, and that the parties

consistently

referred to them jointly, as "overload/adjunct."
It is not a strained contract interpretation therefore to
conclude that Section 3(a), by its terminology "overload/adjunct"
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means that an increase in either would be an increase in both; that
the schedule of rates should apply to both circumstances

insepa-

rably; and that therefore when the adjunct compensation was increased by operation of Section 2, the overload rate was increased
equally by operation of Section

3(a).

I view either contract interpretation as plausible and support
able, and hence the ambiguity.-

,ln such'circumstance the path to a

decision is both well traveled and well settled.

The Arbitrator

looks to past practice for resolution.
Here the past practice is undisputed, and indeed stipulated.
Historically, adjunct compensation rates and overload for full-tim
faculty were linked.

The language of linkage of Section

3(a)

supports that practice.
In my view the University knew of the linkage and the practic
when it negotiated both contracts.

It also knew of Article II

Section 3 of the instant contract which expressly preserves and
perpetuates past practices.
Section 3.

That Section reads:

Past Practices

All bona~fide past practices of the Brooklyn
Center shall be continued and deemed a part
of this agreement.
There is nothing in this record which would question the
historical linkage and practice as other than a "bona fide past
practice" within the meaning of Article II section 3.
Under these circumstances

the University had the burden of

doing more than negotiating a new adjunct rate at Post to bring
about a severance of the linkage and practice.

The increased

adjunct rate at Post, adopted at the Brooklyn Campus by operation
of Section 2, did not in and of itself vitiate the language linkag
of Section 3(a) or the practice under the instant contract of
using the same rate for adjunct compensation and for overload.

In short, the Union had the right to believe that under the practice and the language of Section 3(a), an increase only in the
adjunct rate at Post would result in an increase under the current
contract not just in the adjunct rates at the Brooklyn Campus, but
also an increase in the overload rates at the Brooklyn Campus.
The University should have negotiated clear contract language
resolving the ambiguity in a manner different from the practice,
making clear thereby that the adjunct rates were to be increased
but not the overload rates, and that the historical linkage had
been ended.

It did not do enough to achieve that result.

Accordingly as the adjunct compensation rates were properly
increased not before February 1, 1985, the overload rates, which
I have held remain linked thereto, should be increased and effective also as of February 1, 1985.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
been duly sworn, and having duly heard

the proofs and allegations

of the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Employer did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement when it increased the
adjunct faculty compensation rates effective
February 1, 1985.
The Employer did violate the collective bargaining agreement when it did not increase
the overload rates by the same amounts as the
adjunct compensation rates. The Employer shall
increase the overload compensation rates by
those amounts effective February 1, 1985.
The Union's claim that the increases in adjunct
compensation rates and overload rates should be
made retroative to September 1, 1983, is denied.

DATED: August 5, 1985
STATE OF New York )so .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture
Laboratory Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.
AWARD
and

M & B Control Film Lab
The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement between the above-named Union and
Employer, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
said parties at a hearing on December 3, 1985 makes the following AWARD:
As ruled and directed at the hearing, Ricardo
Sali must become a member in good standing of
the Union by no later than December 5, 1985
and shall remain a member in good standing of
the Union thereafter as a condition of employment pursuant to the applicable law. This
shall include payment of an initiation fee in
in the amount of $150 and the payment or tender of the required dues. If he fails to do
so, the Employer shall discharge him forthwith.
The claims of Tom Moran and Farrell Beazer for
severance pay are denied. They resigned their
jobs and did not cease their employment with
the Employer for the reasons or under the
circumstance for which they would be eligible
for severance pay under the terms of Section
11 of the contract. Resignation is not a
reason or circumstance which carries with it
an entitlement to severance pay.
However, I conclude that if the Employer's
owner, John Rouw and his non-bargaining unit
clerical employer, Dorothy Simmons had not
performed bargaining unit work during the period of the short work week from August 27 to
October 20, 1985, there would have been more
than three days a week work for Moran and
Beazer.
I further conclude that the letter of July
3, 1980 which gave the Union's consent to
Rouw's and Simmon's performance of bargaining unit work, applied to conditions that
obtained at the time the letter was written,
namely and specifically when the bargaining
unit employees were fully employed on a full
work week basis. The Union's agreement that
Rouw and Simmons could do bargaining unit

-2work was not intended to apply when and if
bargaining unit employees were reduced to
less than a full weeks work because of the
loss or reduction in available work. I am
persuaded that the Union would accommodate
the Employer and permit him to do bargaining unit work at variance from the contract
prohibition only when the Union employees
were employed full time and for a full work
week. The Employer's interpretation of the
July 3rd, 1980 letter is inconsistent with
the Union's traditional and unvaried interest in job security and full employment for
its members and those it represents. However, I cannot determine from the record
whether Moran and Beazer would have been
employed the full five days a week if they
were assigned all the available work. The
best I can determine is that they would
have been able to work more than the three
days a week they were scheduled. Additionally, I believe that Rouw believed that he
had the right to continue doing bargaining
unit work even during the short work week
period. Though he was wrong in this belief,
I do not believe that he violated the contract
of the April 30, 1980 letter willfully inthis regard.
Accordingly, Moran and Beazer are entitled
to some monetary damages for the reduction
in their work schedules during the short
work week period, but are not entitled to
be made entirely whole as if they had worked the full five days each week. The appropriate measure of damages is to accord to
both Moran and Beazer one-half of the difference between what they earned working three
days and what they would have earned on a
straight time basis had they worked five
days during the period August 27 to October
20, 1985. The Employer is directed to pay
that amount to each.

DATED: December 8, 1985
STATE OF New York ) ss.
COUNTY OF New York)

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the

:
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Report

*

New Jersey Local Education Association
Demand and Return System

:
:
:

Findings of Fact
and
Determinations

The New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, (attached
hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit A), permits public employers and public employee unions to negotiate representation
fee provisions in collective bargaining agreements.

Under those

provisions a public employer is permitted to withhold and the
majority union may receive a representation or "agency" fee
assessed against employees in the bargaining unit who choose not
to become members of the union representing them.
The act was recently interpreted and held to be constitutional by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Robinson ya State
of New Jersey, Docket No. 82-5698 (3rd Circ. 1984).

The United

States Supreme Court recently considered the agency fee charges
permissible under the Railway Labor Act in Ellis v. B.R.A.C.,
Docket No. 82-1150 (April 25, 1984).

The Ellis decision addresse

the validity of various charges as a matter of statutory interpretation and constitutional propriety. In Ellis, the Court held
that the standard for determining the propriety of the agency fee
expenditures under the Railway Labor Act is;
. . . whether the challenged expenditures are
necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive
representative of the employees in dealing with
the employer on labor-management issues. Under
this standard, objecting employees may be compelled to pay their fair share of not only the
direct costs of negotiating and administering a
collective bargaining contract and of settling

-2grievances and disputes, but also the expenses of activities or undertakings normally or reasonably employed to implement
or effectuate the duties of the union as
exclusive representative of the employees
in the bargaining unit0 Ellis v. B.R.A.C.,
si op. at p.11-12
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the Ellis decision
only addresses chargeable expenditures under the Railway Labor
Act.

However, the Court in Robinson adopted the Ellis standard

for purposes of determining chargeable expenditures under the
New Jersey Act.

Thus at p. 20 (si. op.) the Robinson Court said

as follows:
This past term, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the "germane to collective bargaining" standard for judging the use of mandatory fees over
an employee's objection:
(T)he test must be whether the challenged
expenditures are necessarily or reasonably
incurred for the purpose of performing the
duties of an exclusive representative of
the employees in dealing with the employer
on labor-management issues.
Later in its opinion, in a discussion of the mechanics of the
New Jersey Public Employer-Employee Relations Act, the Robinson
Court twice (at p. 26) repeated the Ellis standard.

Thus under

the New Jersey Act, a majority representative may charge an
agency fee for the costs of negotiating and administering a
collective bargaining agreement, settling grievances and disputes,
and also for the expenses of activities or undertakings normally
or reasonably employed to implement or effectuate the duties of
the union as exclusive representative of the employee in the
bargaining unit.

1

This scope of permissible expenditures is limited by certain
exceptions discussed later in this report.

-3As noted above, certain expenditures are excluded for agenc}
fee purposes, i.e. they cannot be charged to nonmembers as an
agency fee. In particular, the New Jersey Act, at NJSA 34:13A-5
.5(c) mandates a return of any part of an agency fee paid by a
nonmember attributable to expenditures either in aid of activities
or causes of a partisan political or ideological nature only incidentally related to the terms and conditions of employment . . .
In Robinson the Court held that the Federal District Court
had erred in restricting the use of agency fees to lobbying purposes only to secure agency or legislative action required to
implement a collective bargaining agreement.

The Robinson Court,

at pps. 24-25, in analyzing the issue, recognized that a public
employee union, to be effective, must seek its goals in other
forums, beyond the bargaining table (i.e. administrative, judicial
and legislative).

The Robinson Court discussed the workings of

the New Jersey Public Employer-Employee Relations Act, and the
importance of lobbying in relation to the Act, stating as follows:
For New Jersey public employees, collective
bargaining is inextricably intertwined with
legislative change. An examination of the
mechanics of New Jersey's public employee collective bargaining agreements reveals to what
extent the standard terms and conditions of
employment under the NLRA or the RLA are governed by state statute or regulation. Cf.
Fiberboard Paper Products v. NLRB,379 U.S.
203 (1964); R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor
Law, 496-523 (1976) (review of mandatory subjects of bargaining under NLRA). For example,
an affidavit submitted by M. Don Sanchez, the
New Jersey Area Director of the CWA, in the
Olsen proceeding, listed no fewer than fifteen
traditional subjects of bargaining that are
governed by New Jersey statutes, civil service
rules, administrative regulations, or executive

-4orders. Among these are pensions, overtime,
subcontracting, employee transfers, safety
and health, medical plans. App. at 101-15.
Since many of the essential terms and conditions of employment that are mandatory subjects of bargaining under Sections 8(d) and
9(a) of the NLRA are governed by state authorities in the public employment context, a
public employee union unable to lobby the state
authority would be severely handicapped in performing its duties as a bargaining representative.
The Robinson Court then concluded that charges for agency
fees for lobbying are permissible "so long as the lobbying
activities are pertinent to the duties of the union as a bargaining representative and are not used to advance the political and
ideological positions of the union," and;
Under NJSA 34:13A-5.5, a union is allowed to
charge against representation fees the costs
of lobbying activities designed to foster policy goals in collective negotiations and contract administration or to secure for the employees represented advantages in wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment in addition
to those secured through collective negotiations
with the public employer, (at p.26)
Accordingly, under the Act, as judicially interpreted, and
consistent with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, any portion of a non-member's agency fee used for a proscribed purpose is to be refunded to that non-member on demand„
To meet the foregoing requirements; to avoid the use or
expenditure of any portion of a non-member agency fee for a prohibited purpose, to institutionalize an impartial determination
of whether an agency fee has been used improperly; and to facilitate the process of making refunds if necessary, the New Jersey
Education Association, hereinafter referred to as the "Association
or as "NJEA," receives from its local affiliates, hereinafter

-5referred to as "local association(s)" an amount equal to 85% of
the dues normally charged members, times the number of agency
fee payers, as the cumulative agency fee for non-members

under

collective bargaining agreements with agency fee provisions; and
the "local associations" have promulgated Demand and Return
Systems, attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit B.
These Systems were held to satisfy constitutional requirements
in Robinson v. State of New Jersey, supra.
In accordance with Section A of said Demand and Return
System, the Undersigned was selected to serve as the Representation Fee Umpire "to determine the percentage of the Association's
dues income for the 1983-84 membership year that was expended for
purposes related to negotiations, administering collective bargaining agreements, settling grievances and disputes involving
activities or undertakings normally or reasonably employed to
implement or effectuate the duties of the Union as exclusive
representative of employees in the bargaining unit," and, per
force conversely, the percentage, if any, of its expenditures used
for purposes not related to those activities, which if supported
or paid for by any portion of an agency fee would constitute an
improper use of such fee, entitling the non-member to a refund
in the amount so used.
In carrying out my assignment I have been guided by the
aforesaid citations, and also by the decision of the United State
Supreme Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and other
relevant court citations related thereto.

-6I met with representatives of the Association on January
8 and January 10, 1985.

At my request I was provided with the

Association's budget for the 1983-1984 membership year, the
audited statement of its actual expenses for that year, underlying documents and other original material affirming and supportjive of said expenses, its Reports to the Delegate Assembly dated
January 19, 1985, detailed and extensive written and verbal statements of the activities and responsibilities of the various
divisions of the Association for which there are budget allocations and expenditures, and examples of the "work product" or
services of those divisions in the form of reports, publications,
memoranda, programs and research.
Over the aforesaid period of time I interviewed Directors
of the Association, or representatives of the divisions for which
there were budget allocations and expenditures during the 19831984 membership year.

I am satisfied that with regard to budge-

tary expenditures, my discussions with those persons, and my
examinations

of the records and activities for which they are

responsible, were comprehensive, searching and thorough.
FINDINGS OF FACT
During the 1983-1984 membership year the Association's
total expenditures (for the purposes of this report overwhelmingly and materially

from dues), was $17,360,450.

That amount

was apportioned among and accounted for by the following nine
divisions with the amounts spent by each division as follows:

-7UniServ
Legal Services
Research & Economic Services
Communications
Government Relations
Instruction and Training
Business Division
Governance and Administration
Fringe Benefits

$4}492,234
2,556,317
822,542
1,644,098
408,433
996,229
2,889,092
1,570,446
1,981,059

A description of the responsibilities and activities of
1
the foregoing divisions and my determinations of which of said
activities and the expenditures thereof fall within the category
for which the use of funds from an agency fee is proscribed, are
as follows:
UNI-SERV DIVISION
UNISERV HEADQUARTERS' OFFICE
Provides for personnel costs for headquarters'
based staff.
ACTIVE SUPPORTIVE
This category provides for promotion, organizing
efforts, leadership training and a newsletter
for active supportive members. This appropriation
supplements the funds presently included in other
accounts for service to active supportive members0
MEMBERSHIP MEETINGS
To cover the cost of postage, travel, meals, promotion, and materials to aid membership orientation and information exchange„
MEMBERSHIP PROMOTION
To provide for forms, promotional materials, postage, and other expenses for conducting the annual
membership campaign.
NEGOTIATION CONSULTANTS
NJEA negotiation consultants assist UniServ representatives in actively representing teachers and
other school personnel in negotiations with school
boards and in processing of grievances. The requested amount is for earnings, expenses, and employer's share of state and federal taxes.

1. Except, for reasons later explained, the Division of Governanc
and Administration and "Fringe Benefits."

-8STRENGTHEN LOCALS
To provide emergency financial assistance to
local associations experiencing exceptional
problems and challenges and to defeat attempts
by other membership organizations to raid the
membership. (See Revenue page for NBA supplement under "Organizing Support.)
HIGHER EDUCATION
To provide for materials, postage, newsletters,
conferences, periodicals, and leadership training for the Higher Education Unit.
REGIONAL OFFICES PERSONNEL
Provides for staffing of eighteen (18) UniServ
offices, including the Higher Education office.
REGIONAL OFFICES OPERATING COSTS
Provides for office materials and supplies,
travel and meal expenses, telephone, postage,
and various miscellaneous items.
REGIONAL OFFICES RENT
Provides for the rentals of eighteen (18)
UniServ offices and for related custodial
and utilities requirements.
REGIONAL OFFICES FURNITURE & EQUIPMENT
Provides for the replacement and amortization
of typewriters, copiers, and other business
machines and office furniture.
Based on the entire record before me I conclude that the
foregoing activities and expenditures
are related to collective
"
bargaining, contract administration or grievance handling within
the controlling statutory and judicially determined meaning
thereof except the following:
Uni-Serv Headquarters Office
That portion of the costs and expenditures
devoted to NJEA and NEA convention staffing,
PTA and School Board Association activities
and out-of-state meetings and workshops,
in the amount of

$56,373

Active Supportive
That portion of costs and expenditures devoted to members only benefits and organizing or political activity,
in the amount of

$61,921
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Membership Meetings
That portion of those meetings devoted to
member-only benefits and political activities,
in the amount of

$26,478

Membership Promotion
That portion of expenditures devoted to
materials which promote members-only benefits, i.e., attorney referral program, supplemental economic services, etc.,
in the amount of

$ 17 ,900

Negotiations Consultants
That portion of these expenditures was
used for the NEA Unification campaign
during 1983-1984 and for the Woodbridge
representation election,
in the amount of

$ 8,864

Strengthening Locals
That portion of these expenditures was used
for organizing purposes in Woodbridge and
Newark,
in the amount of

$36,675

1. Higher Education
That portion of meetings and materials devoted
to member-only benefits and organizing or
political in the State Colleges or activity,
in the amount of

$ 3,759

2. Uni-Serv Regional Office Personnel
That portion of staff activities devoted to
NJEA Convention Staffing, PSA/NSO, GSA activities, pension consultations, travel inquiries, attorney referral program, out-ofstate meetings and workshops,
in the amount of

$212,492

3. Regional Operating Costs
That portion of expenditures and costs devoted to member-only benefits and political
activity,

-10in the amount of

$19,838

4. Regional Offices Rent
That portion of rental space devoted to member-only benefits and political activity,
in the amount of

$ 15 ,145

5. Regional Offices Furniture & Equipment
That portion of furniture and equipment devoted or allocatable to member-only benefits
and political activity,
in the amount of
TOTAL0

$ 2,213
$461,657

NOTE: 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 - For purposes of calculating that part
of the NBA UNISERV grant used for proscribed activities, I calculate that 8.137o of the cost of these activities were so
expended.
LEGAL SERVICES DIVISION
Maintains legal protection and support for bargaining unit
members and local Associations in cases involving job security,
employee discipline, breaches of law or contract by school boards
Pays one-half cost of local arbitrations service maintained
through 16 retained law firms and headquarters staff in executive
office.
Promotes and protects professional rights of members and
affilitates through the Professional Rights and Responsibilities
Committees.

Financial assistance is granted for affirmative

action in such diverse areas of concern as non-tenure teacher
rights, academic freedom, court suits, negotiations, tenure protection, withholding of increments, hardship cases, restraining

-11orders, suspensions unilateral board actions, pension appeals,
assault and battery charges, fact-finding inquiries, and arbitration hearings.
I conclude that a portion of the cases and
legal matters handled by the Division of
Legal Services falls within the area of proscribed activities. These activities are,
agency shop litigation expenses, legal costs
of bargaining elections, umpire's fees,
Moment of Silence amicus, agency shop arbitration, and the attendant staff costs
in the amount of

$110,910

RESEARCH AND ECONOMIC SERVICES DIVISION
Responsible for analyzing contracts and publishing periodic
studies of the various provisions in current collective bargainin
contracts; consults with and assists field staff and local associations with school district budget analysis, fact-finding, salary
guide construction and other financial aspects of collective bargaining; coordinates research segment of annual training conference designed to assist local negotiators; analyzes proposed
legislation in order to identify bills which would be damaging
to local bargaining efforts and other NJEA activities; answers
occasional questions dealing with unemployment insurance.

Pro-

vides sample survey research services primarily relative to the
Association's collective bargaining stance; performs general research projects primarily directed at responding to requests from
local association leaders and field staff for information necessary
for collective bargaining or grievance arbitration.
Maintains the Research Library with duties of analyzing
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legal decisions, arbitration awards, Public Employment Relation
Commission rulings, and individual legal opinions; creates indexes
of the aforementioned materials in order that they will be accessible to field representatives, local negotiators and grievance
chair persons; provides full text of such materials upon request
from field representatives, local negotiators and grievance chair
persons; distributes NJEA statistical bulletins for collective
bargaining upon request.
Collects information from local school districts and state
agencies and prepares statistical bulletins and circulars based
upon such information for collective bargaining.
Conducts individual consultations to and with members in
the areas of pensions, fringe benefits; conducts workshops for
members concerning pensions and fringe benefit programs.

Re-

sponsible for NJEA Special Services program which consists of a
variety of offerings for members' benefits including the
Washington National Group Income Protection Plan, the Magic Kingdom Club, the TSO loan program and the Travel Service.
I conclude that the costs and expenditures
allocated to Special Services for members
only (except the Travel Service), a portion
of salaries of two employees dealing with research on matters unrelated to collective bargaining, contract administration or grievance
processing, a portion of the costs of the
Library and a portion of certain materials and
supplies, should be excluded from costs and
expenditures related to collective bargaining,
contract administration and grievance processing. The costs and expenditures of the Travel
Service are not among those prohibited. No dues
or agency fees are used for that purpose. The
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costs are covered by revenues earned by the
Travel Service. I calculate the total proscribed costs to be
$152,540.
COMMUNICATIONS
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE
Provides for personnel cost for the
Communications Division.
AUDIO-VISUAL PROGRAMS
Provides for the purchase of materials
and equipment to be used by the Media
Center for the production of audio-visual
and training films.
PRESS RELATIONS
Provides for materials, postage, and supplies used for press releases and relations.
The amount includes funds for the President's
column to appear in the Sunday Star Ledger
and Philadelphia Inquirer, N.J. Supplement.
PUBLIC MEDIA
To provide printed, visual, and audio materials, billboards for public consumption in
connection with NJEA campaigns and positions
(i.e. tenure, school finance and taxes, reduction in force). Also, to provide to
locals materials for community relations
activities.
LOCAL LEADER
Provides for thirty-five (35) weekly mailings and ten (10) monthly mailings to leaders of 1700 local and county affiliates and
ten (10) mailings to 6800 association representatives.
REVIEW MAGAZINE
Provides for the cost of printing, mailing,
and art work for the production of NJEA's
magazine, the REVIEW.
REPORTER
Provides for the cost of printing, mailing,
and art work for the REPORTER.
I conclude that the following activities and the expenditures related thereto as indicated below are not related to
collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance
processing.
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Audio-Visual
Small percentage of radio tapes and video
tapes used to support political action
programs,
in the amount of

$ 9,770.07

Press Relations
News media staff gives support to notify
public of recommendations of political
action committee and of other member activities on behalf of "educator for"
committees,
in the amount of

$36,589.44

Public Media Projects
Portion of local community relations training and organizing funds used to assist local affiliates that wish to be active on behalf of budgets and/or candidates in local
school elections. Most of this account is
for paid newspaper, magazine, billboard and
radio ads -- none of which is used other than
to enhance image of members represented and
to support members' bargaining efforts. A
portion of this budget (8%) in Campaign and
Organizing and in Materials covers training,
building posters, and special promotions designed to get out a "YES" vote for local
school budgets in April, as well as assist
local committees working on behalf of the
election of board members,
in the amount of.

$37,814.09

Review
Monthly magazine carries articles on education developments in general and by State
agencies that impact on work of members represented. Very small portion of magazine
deals with political action activities. occasional magazine articles deal with controversial social issues outside the realm of
education work of members represented,
in the amount of

$64,782.75

-15Local Leader
Special weekly mailings to affiliate presidents and monthly mailings to association
representatives in each building deal mostly with leadership material in support of
bargaining and representational issues. Occasional information is carried on political
action efforts,
in the amount of

$

8,581.26

Reporter
Monthly newspaper is main vehicle for informing membership when political activities do
take place„ However, this is mainly done in
October endorsement issue. Last year 15% of
the Reporter's pages were used specifically
for reporting on Political Action endorsements.
Special October issue prints distributes organization's annual convention program. This
includes a small portion of programming on
controversial social issues outside the realm
of education work of members represented,
in the amount of

$ 33,301.34

Service to Other Divisions
Publications and media support is provided for
programs operated by other divisions, some of
which is beyond normal representational activity,
in the amount of

$ 13,512.77

For a total of

$204,351.71

GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
The activity of Government Relations centers around three
major responsibilities:
1)
2)
3)

lobbying
political action
regulatory aspects of State agencies

LOBBYING
This includes extraordinary contact with internal
bodies (e.g., Executive Committee, Delegate Assembly, Government Relations Committee); regular contact with corporate legal counsel; daily contact
with officials of government including Secretary
of State, Attorney General, Department of Banking,

-16Department of Civil Service, Department of
Community Affairs, Department of Education,
Department of Higher Education, Department
of Human Services, Department of Insurance,
Department of Labor & Industry, Department
of the Treasury, and Chief Counsel; 40 members of the N.J. Senate; 80 members of the
N.J. General Assembly; approximately 240
government aides; 2 U.S. Senators; 14 members of the U.S. House of Representatives.
Also, contact with a couple of hundred people in N.J. public affairs, including lobbyists, journalists, coalitions such as N.J.
Citizen Action, labor unions, drinking age,
etc., with local affiliate presidents as requested by the NJEA UniServ offices; and
with the NEA Government Relations staff on
federal legislative matters.
Activities of this Division which fall in the proscribed
categories as unrelated to collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance handling, as defined by statute and
court decisions, can be best quantified by percentages of the
Division Budget in the three areas of:
Legislative Conference
Legislative Field Project
Legislative Publications
Included in the foregoing are the following lobbying activities
not related to permissable activities:
A-1825 - To establish the State Council on the Arts in
the Department of State; increases the public
membership.
S-1745 - Transfers the State Council on the Arts to the
Department of State; increases the public membership.
A-258 - Permits the continued use of certain school
buses for 12 years.
A-1785 - Establishes an Education Testing Program, eliminates the minimum Basic Scills Testing Program;
appropriates $911,000.
A-3318 - Designated the "Worker & Community Right to
Know Act" concerning certain hazardous substances
in the workplace and the community; appropriates
$1,700,000.

-17A-2061 - Designated the "Infrastructure Bank Act,"
A-2143 - creates the infrastructure bank; appropriates $95,000.
A-1064 - Permits students of public schools to partipate in a one-minute period of silence before the opening of each school day.
A-167 - Provides procedures for standardized testing.
S-1962 - Requires every board of education to adopt
a course of study in science and mathematics
in elementary grades and in high school.
A-2249 - Provides for health care benefits for certain
retired employees of local board of education
and institutions of higher education.
SCR-30 - Proposes an amendment to the Constitution to
provide for constitutional amendments by
initiative petition.
And lobbying on legislation concerned with Child Abuse,
Urban Economic Development, Divestiture of Pension Funds in
Companies that do business in or with South Africa, Equal Rights
Amendment and Age Discrimination.
POLITICAL ACTION
The authority for NJEA PAC is found in the NJEA
PAC Guidelines: "History." A Political Action
Study Committee was established by the NJEA Delegate Assembly in November 1971 to explore the
feasibility of political action by NJEA members
to the extent of endorsing candidates and
participating in political campaigns for their
election to office. Reaching the conclusion
that the NJEA should establish a political action
committee closely allied to the NJEA structure,
the Study Committee recommended an information
program for the membership which was adopted by
the NJEA Delegate Assembly in May 1972. NJEA
Delegate Assembly approval at its November 1972
meeting signaled the beginning of organized
political action for the teachers of New Jersey.
In February 1973, the NJEA Executive Committee
adopted general guiding principles and established the NJEA PAC fund.
As with lobbying, there is a tremendous amount
of internal contact which must be maintained in
the political action field. Many of the comments
on people contact, the work done and informational writing are similar in political action. The
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Division deals with:
--offices of the Democratic and Republican parties
--county chairpersons of the Democratic and
Republican parties
--240 party candidates plus independents
--campaign managers
--work with coalitions on certain candidates
--media people
--NJEA member volunteers to approximately 50-60
campaigns
--NJEA PAC Operating Committee (comprised of the
NJEA Executive Committee, County Presidents,
and NJEA Government Relations Committee)
--NJEA PAC Board of Trustees (comprised of the
NJEA Executive Committee)
--Federal Elections Commission
--Clerk of the U.S. Senate
--Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives
--N.J. Election Law Enforcement Commission
--Attorney General's office
--NEA-PAC staff
AGENCY MONITORING
Agency monitoring became a responsibility of the
NJEA Government Relations Division by NJEA Executive Committee approval of a staff reorganization
plan in August 1981.
As in lobbying and political action, there is considerable and external contact with people and
public bodies, for example:
--members of the Certification, Evaluation and
Tenure Committee
--Commissioner of Education
--approximately 20 members of the State Department of Education staff bureaucracy
--State Board of Education
--State Board of Higher Education
--State Board of Examiners
--State Department of Education-related commissions, councils, advisory committees, on
which some 30 NJEA members and staff serve
--3 Regional Curriculum Service Units
I find that 4% of the expenditures of the
budget for Legislative Conference involved
proscribed activities,
in the amount of

$

917 .13

-19-

77o of the expenditures of the budget for
Legislative Field Project involved proscribed activities,
in the amount of

$22,699.47

12% of the expenditures of the budget for
Legislative Publications involved proscribed
activities,
in the amount of

$ 7,347.20

For a total amount of

$30,963.80

INSTRUCTION AND TRAINING
INSTRUCTION AND TRAINING OFFICE
Provides for personnel costs of the Instruction and Training Division, including the
Professional Development Institute.
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
To provide funds for the protection and enhancement of professional rights; i.e. teacher evaluation, compensatory education, tenure,
certification, and assistance to local associations .
INSTRUCTIONAL ACTIVITIES
To provide funds for activities related to
furtherance of educational quality, i.e.,
human relations, high school graduation requirements, violence and vandalism, migrant
education, environmental education, gifted
talented standards, exceptional children,
Good Ideas Conference, etc.
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT & IN-SERVICE
To provide funds for television in-service
series, cooperative projects with colleges
and other organizations and professional
development project feasibility study.
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
To provide funds for addressing emerging
critical issues and special activities; i.e.,
recertification, monitoring State Board of
Education, EIC's and teacher centers.
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE
Provides funds for establishing the components of the Institute (transcript service,
directory, endorsement of programs, registry,
certificates of attendance, etc.) as operating services.
LEADERSHIP WORKSHOPS
To provide for speakers, facilities, postage,

-20travel, meals promotion and materials at various local leader conferences during the year.
LEADERSHIP OPERATIONS
This is the basic training account. It provides for materials, supplies, and expenses
for leadership training at the local level.
Included are the cost of handbooks, new
teacher kits, and cost of providing the A/R
Handbook.
SUMMER LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
To provide for speakers, facilities, postage,
travel, meals, promotion and materials for
Workshops I and II at Monte lair State College <>
Funds are also included for grants to aid
locals in sending Association Representatives
to the Workshop.
TRAINING CONSULTANTS
Provides for part-time training consultants
to assist locals in workshops of a professional
nature.
CONVENTION PROGRAMS
Provides funds for programmatic expenses, staff
accommodations and meals, promotional activities
and materials, group meetings, dances and other
functions, printing and distribution of the program and directory and aid to affiliated groups.
I conclude that the following costs and expenditures are
not related to collective bargaining, contract

administration

or grievance processing.
The job location service and the Impaired
School Employee Program,
in the amount of

$ 21,995

The costs of training on how to conform to
state regulations on record keeping,
in the amount of

$ 33,455

The costs of the specialized services and
materials relating to the performance and
working conditions of the employee at the
worksite, which are available for members
only,
in the amount of

„. . $ 25,188

About 10% of the costs of the Summer Leadership Conference devoted to political activity,
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in the amount of

$

4,900

The total cost of programmatic expenses related to the annual NJEA convention (for
members only),
in the amount of

$ 72,488

For a total of

$158,026

BUSINESS DIVISION
BUSINESS OFFICE
Provides for personnel costs for the business office, as well as for temporary and
contracted help for total operations.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Provides for personnel, materials, supplies
and equipment costs for the accounting office.
COMPUTER CENTER
Provides for personnel, materials, supplies
and computer equipment and software amortization costs. Also included are funds for
the replacement of fully depreciated air
conditioning equipment.
MEMBERSHIP PROCESSING
Provides for personnel, contracted services,
membership processing reimbursement to locals,
supplies, materials, and postage for this unit.
The proposed amount includes funds for improving the dues accounting system.
HEADQUARTERS' OPERATIONS
Provides for personnel, supplies and materials,
taxes, mortgage amortization, maintenance, building repairs and renovations, equipment replacement repairs and rentals custodial services,
utilities and insurance for NJEA headquarters.
CAPITOL STREET OPERATIONS
Provides for personnel, supplies and materials,
taxes, maintenance, equipment rental and replacement and servicing, utilities for the mail
room, storage room and space for NJEA Travel
Service.
ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT
To provide kits and materials to be used for
the improvement of local organizational management. Funds are also requested to cover workshops for local officers; i.e., Presidents' and
Treasurers' Workshops.
CONVENTION EXPOSITION
Provides for Convention Hall rental, decorating
and drayage services, exhibit kits, security and
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other facility related costs in Atlantic
City.
CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION
Provides for the renovation and rehabilitation of the NJEA Headquarters building. The
lower level is completed. The funds requested are to begin work on the upper levels. It
is anticipated that this will be a two year
project with additional funding needed from
next year's budget.
NBA CONVENTION
The amount proposed is based upon full funding for up to 450 state delegates, in addition to funds for operating, administrative,
and function expenses while at the Convention.
OFFICE AUTOMATION
Provides funds for the first phase of a three
phase computer network with NJEA Headquarters
and regional offices.
I conclude that the following costs and expenditures, calculated primately in the amount of time spent by staff of this
Division on matters unrelated to collective bargaining, contract
administration and grievance handling are:
2.8% of the time of the Director's office,
in the amount of

$

7,434

4.9% of the time of the staff of Data Processing/Computer Center/Office Automation
(for political campaign purposes),
in the amount of

$ 33,943

11.4% of the time of the staff of the accounting office (for political oriented transactions),
in the amount of

$ 14,194

4.57o of the time of the staff of Membership
Processing, (for political campaign purposes),
in the amount of

$ 16,377

8.6% of the time of Capitol Street Operations
(for political activities),
in the amount of

$ 31,457
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Plus the net cost and expenses of the NJEA
Convention (for members only),
in the amount of

$117,864

Plus overhead costs related to the foregoing,
in the amount of

$100,397

For a total of

$321,666

The total foregoing excluded costs and expenditures during the 1983-1984 membership year total, $1,440,115 or

10.4%

of the total NJEA budget and expenditures for that year.
I consider it logical and appropriate therefore to conclude that 10.4%

of Governance and Administration division ex-

penses is attributable to excluded activities, in the amount
of

$163,326 and

that 10.4%

of the Fringe Benefit account be treated similarly,

in the amount of

$162,160.

Accordingly, the total amount of expenditures during
the 1983-1984 membership year that were unrelated to the
statutory and/or judicially determined matters of collective
bargaining, contract administration or grievance handling is
$1,765,601.
This amount constitutes 10.17% of the total NJEA expenditures for the 1983-1984 membership year.
DETERMINATION
10.17% of the total NJEA budget and expenditures for the 1983-1984 membership year were
for activities statutorily or judicially determined to be unrelated to collective bargaining, contract administration or grievance processing, and may not be financed from represent-
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ative or "agency" fees paid by non-members.
Conversely, 89.83% of the total budget and
expenditures were used for permitted activities on behalf of non-members as well as
members. As the non-member paid an "agency"
fee only 85% of what a member paid in dues,
I conclude that the NJEA spent more for permitted activities on behalf of non-members
(as well as members) than non-members contributed toward those activities. Inasmuch
as the representative or "agency" fee of a
non-member was 15% less than the dues paid
by a member, it would appear that none of
the proscribed activities were paid for out
of an agency fee. Accordingly, non-members
are not entitled to refunds from the NJEA
portion of the representation fee.

Eric J. Schmertz
Representation Fee Umpire
DATED: February 11, 1985
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Umpire that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

^

In the Matter of the
Umpire's

Report

j New Jersey Local Education Association
Demand and Return System

Findings of Fact
and
Determinations

The New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, (attached
hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit A), permits public
employers and public employee unions to negotiate representation fee provisions in collective bargaining agreements.

Under

those provisions a public employer is permitted to withhold and
the majority union may receive a representation or "agency" fee
assessed against employees in the bargaining unit who choose not
to become members of the union representing them.
However, the Act as interpreted in Paul H. Robinson, et al
v. State of New Jersey and Joseph W. Antonacci, et al y. State
of New Jersey (attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit
ij B) prohibits the use of any part of an "agency" fee for purposes
j!
i| not related to collective bargaining, contract administration
ij
f |
ij and grievance processing (including the prohibited use of any
i
portion of "agency" fee for lobbying purposes other than lobbying |
>
j
\ specifically to secure agency or legislative action required to

i

implement a collective bargaining agreement).
Under the Act, as judicially interpreted, and consistent

jj with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, any

j
i
:

portion of a non-member's agency fee used for a proscribed purpose,
|
1
i is to be refunded to that non-member on demand.

-2To meet the foregoing requirements; to avoid the use or
expenditure of any portion of a non-member agency fee for a
prohibited purpose; to institutionalize an impartial determination of whether an agency fee has been used improperly;
and to facilitate the process of making refunds if necessary,
the -New Jersey EducatiorLAsi,
it

.

ii

asj
/ZAS
non-members it represents under 'collective bargaining agreements with agency fee provisions

that is 157o less than the

:harged members; and -bars promulgated pf Demand and Return
System.5

• ^C^-t-t ached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit

C.)
In accordance with Section A of said Demand^and Return
System, the Undersigned was selected to serve as the Representation Fee Umpire "to determine the percentage of the Association's
dues income for the 1982-83 membership year that was expended
for purposes related to collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance processing," and, per force conversely,
the percentage, if any, of its expenditures used for purposes
not related to those activities, which if supported or paid
for by any portion of an agency fee would constitute an improper
use of such fee, entitling the non -member to a refund in the
amount so used .
In carrying out my assignment I have been guided by the
aforesaid citations, by the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education ( attached

-3hereto and made part hereof as Exhibit D) and the other relevant
federal court citations related thereto.
I met with representatives of the Association on October
10, October 19, November 4 and November 23, 1983.

At my request

I was provided with the Association's budget for the 1982-83
membership year, the audited statement of its actual expenses
for that year, underlying documents and other original material
affirming and supportive of said expenses, its Reports to the
Delegate Assembly dated March 14, 1983, detailed and extensive
written and verbal statements of the activities and responsibilities of the various divisions of the Association for which
there are budget allocations and expenditures, and examples of
the "work product" or services of those divisions in the form of
reports, publications, memoranda, programs and research.
Over the aforesaid period of time I interviewed officers
of the Association, its financial and accounting personnel and
the heads or representatives of the divisions for which there
were budget allocations and expenditures during the 1982-83
membership year.

I am satisfied that with regard to budgetary

expenditures, my discussions with those persons, and my examinations of the records and activities for which they are
responsible, were comprehensive, searching and thorough.

-4FINDINGS OF FACT

During the 1982-83 membership year the Association's
total expenditures (for the purposes of this report overwhelmingly and materially from dues), was $16,146,600.

That amount,

including an appropriation to Reserves, was apportioned among
and accounted for by the following eight divisions with the
amounts spent by each division as follows:
Uni-Serv
Legal Services
Research, Economics & Service
Communications
Government Relations
Instruction and Training
Business Division
Governance and Administration

$5,017.440
2,212.423
996,764
1,646.200
534,554
1,235,331
2,353,091
1,516,230

Apportioned to Reserves was the amount of $634,5670
A description of the responsibilities and activities of
£LfUfrf~f+- ^^- **f '*£***• (je/^&n/
the *[U lil [i.'lji i l foregoing divisions and my determinations of
which of said activities and the expenditures thereof fall
within the category for which the use of funds from an agency
fee is proscribed, are as follows:
UNI-SERV

DIVISION

UNISERV HEADQUARTERS' OFFICE
Provides for personnel costs for headquarters' based staff.
ACTIVE SUPPORTIVE
This category provides for promotion, organizing efforts, leadership training and a
newsletter for active supportive members.
The appropriation supplements the funds presently included in other accounts for service
to active supportive members.
MEMBERSHIP MEETINGS
To cover the cost of postage, travel, meals,
promotion, and materials to aid membership
orientation and information exchange.

MEMBERSHIP PROMOTION
To provide for forms, promotional materials,
postage, and other expenses for conducting
the annual membership campaign.
NEGOTIATION CONSULTANTS
NJEA negotiations consultants assist UniServ
representatives in actively representing
teachers and other school personnel in negotiations with school boards and in processing
of grievances. The requested amount is for
earnings, expenses, and employer's share of
state and federal taxes.
STRENGTHEN LOCALS
To provide emergency financial assistance to
local associations experiencing exceptional
problems and challenges and to defeat attempts
by other membership organizations to raid the
membership.
(See Revenue page for NEA supplement under "Organizing Support.)
HIGHER EDUCATION
To provide for materials, postage, newsletters,
conferences, periodicals, and leadership training for the Higher Education Unit.
REGIONAL OFFICES PERSONNEL
Provides for staffing of eighteen (18) UniServ
offices, including the Higher Education office.
REGIONAL OFFICES OPERATING COSTS
Provides for office materials and supplies,
travel and meal expenses, telephone, postage,
and various miscellaneous items.
REGIONAL OFFICES RENT
Provides for the rentals of eighteen (18)
UniServ offices and for related custodial
and utilities requirements.
REGIONAL OFFICES FURNITURE & EQUIPMENT
Provides for the replacement and amortization
of typewriters, copiers, and other business
machines and office furniture.
Based on the entire record before me I conclude that
^]

A^_

fqjjfowing activities and expenditures -atre" TO£ related to collective bargaining, contract administration or grievance handling
witjhin dae---^ntrojl3rrnl;slrarto

\-
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Uni-Serv Headquarters Office
That portion of the costs and expenditures
devoted to NJEA and NEA convention staffing,
lobbying activities, PTA and School Board
Association activities and out-of-state
meetings and workshops,
in the amount of

$31,350

Active Supportive
That portion of costs and expenditures devoted to members only benefits and legislative and political activity,
in the amount of

$ 2,050

Membership Meetings
That portion of those meetings devoted to
member-only benefits and legislative or
political activities,
in the amount of

$ 14 ,700

Membership Promotion
That portion of expenditures devoted to
materials which promote members-only
benefits, i.e., attorney referral program,
supplemental economic services, etc.,
in the amount of

$ 11,500

-6Higher Education
That portion of meetings and materials
devoted to member-only benefits and
political or legislative activity,
in the amount of,

$

945

Uni-Serv Regional Office Personnel
That portion of staff activities devoted
to NJEA Convention Staffing, PSA/NSO, GSA
activities, pension consultations, travel
inquiries, attorney referral program, outof-state meetings and workshops,
in the amount of

$149,035

Regional Operating Costs
That portion of expenditures and costs devoted to member-only benefits and political
or legislative activity,
in the amount of

$ 19,920

Regional Offices Rent
That portion of rental space devoted to
member-only benefits and political or
legislative activity,
in the amount of

$ 13,250

Regional Offices Furniture & Equipment
That portion of furniture and equipment
devoted or allocatable to member-only
benefits and political or legislative
activity,
in the amount of
TOTAL

. .$

4 ,150

$246,900
LEGAL SERVICES DIVISION

Maintains legal protection and support for bargaining
unit members and local Associations in cases involving job
security, employee discipline, breaches of law or contract by

-7school boards.

Pays one-half cost of local arbitrations service

maintained through 16 retained law firms and headquarters staff
in executive office.
Promotes and protects professional rights of members and
affiliates through the Professional Rights and Responsibilities i
j
Committees. Financial assistance is granted for affirmative
|I

|
:

action in such diverse areas of concern as non-tenure teacher
rights, academic freedom, court suits, negotiations, tenure

;
I
j

protection, withholding of increments, hardship cases, restrain- ]
ing orders, suspensions, unilateral board actions, pension
appeals, assault and battery charges, fact-finding inquiries,
and arbitration hearings.
I conclude that a small portion of the cases
and legal matters handled by the Division of
Legal Services such as the costs of an amicus
brief in the Moment of Silence case and costs
involved in writing and analyzing legislation
are not related to collective bargaining contract administration or grievance processing.
I calculate the costs and expenditures thereof
to have been
$ 46,600
RESEARCH AND ECONOMIC SERVICES DIVISION
Responsible for analyzing contracts and publishing periodic!
studies of the various provisions in current collective bargaining contracts; consults with and assists field staff and local
associations with school district budget analysis, fact-finding,
salary guide construction and other financial aspects of collective bargaining; coordinates research segment of annual training
conference designed to assist local negotiators; analyzes proposed legislation in order to identify bills which would be

-8damaging to local bargaining efforts and other NJEA activities; :
•
answers occasional questions dealing with unemployment insurance.
Provides sample survey research services primarily relative to
j

the Association's collective bargaining stance; performs generalj
I
research projects primarily directed at responding to requests
I
from local association leaders and field staff for information
necessary for collective bargaining or grievance arbitration.
Maintains the Research Library with duties of analyzing
legal decisions, arbitration awards, Public Employment Relation
Commission rulings, and individual legal opinions; creates
indexes of the aforementioned materials in order that they will
be accessible to field representatives, local negotiators and
grievance chair persons; provides full text of such materials
upon request from field representatives, local negotiators and
grievance chair persons; distributes NJEA statistical bulletins
for collective bargaining upon request.
Collects information from local school districts and
state agencies and prepares statistical bulletins and circulars
based upon such information for collective bargaining.
Conducts individual consultations to and with members in
the areas of pensions, fringe benefits; conducts workshops for
members concerning pensions and fringe benefit programs.

Re-

sponsible for NJEA Special Services program which consists of a
variety of offerings for members' benefits including the
Washington National Group Income Protection Plan, the Magic
i

Kingdom Club, the TSO loan program and the Travel Service.

-9I conclude that the costs and expenditures
allocated to Special Services for members only
(except the Travel Service), a portion (19%)
of salaries of two employees dealing with research on matters unrelated to collective bargaining, contract administration or -grievance
processing, a portion (10%) of the costs of the
Library and a portion (70%) of certain materials
and supplies, should be excluded from costs and
expenditures related to collective bargaining,
contract administration and grievance processing.
The costs and expenditures of the Travel Service
are not among those prohibited. No dues or
agency fees are used for that purpose. The
costs are covered by revenues earned by the
Travel Service. I calculate the total proscribed costs to be
$161,731.
COMMUNICATIONS
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE
Provides for personnel cost for the
Communications Division.
AUDIO-VISUAL PROGRAMS
Provides for the purchase of materials
and equipment to be used by the Media
Center for the production of audio-visual
and training films.
PRESS RELATIONS
Provides for materials, postage, and
supplies used for press releases and
relations. The amount includes funds
for the President's column to appear in
the Sunday Star Ledger and Philadelphia
Inquirer, N.J. Supplement.
PUBLIC MEDIA
To provide printed, visual, and audio
materials, billboards for public consumption in connection with NJEA campaigns
and positions (i.e. tenure, school finance
and taxes, reduction in force). Also, to
provide to locals materials for community
relations activities.
LOCAL LEADER
Provides for thirty-five (35) weekly mailings and ten (10) monthly mailings to leaders
of 1700 local and county affiliates and ten
(10) mailings to 6800 association representatives.
REVIEW MAGAZINE
Provides for the cost of printing, mailing,
and art work for the production of NJEA's
magazine, the REVIEW.

-10RE PORTER
Provides for the cost of printing, mailing, and art work for the REPORTER.
I conclude that the following activities and the
expenditures related thereto as indicated below
are not related to collective bargaining, contract
administration and grievance processing.
Audio-Visual
Small percentage of radio tapes and video
tapes used to support political action
programs,
in the amount of

$

9,430.02

Press Relations
News media staff gives support to notify
public of recommendations of political
action committee and of other member activities on behalf of "educator for"
committees,
in the amount of

$ 23, 642. 62

Public Media Projects
Portion of local community relations training and organizing funds used to assist
local affiliates
that wish to be active
on behalf of budgets and/or candidates in
local school elections. Most of this account
is for paid newspaper, magazine, billboard,
and radio ads -- none of which is used other
than to enhance image of members represented
and to support members' bargaining efforts.
A portion of this budget (8%) in Campaign and
Organizing and in Materials covers training,
building posters, and special promotions designed to get out a "YES" vote for local
school budgets in April, as well as assist
local committees working on behalf of the
election of board members,
in the amount of

$ 34 ,887 .02

Review
Monthly magazine carries articles on education

-11developments in general and by State agencies
that impact on work of members represented.
Very small portion of magazine deals with
political action activities. Occasional
magazine articles deal with controversial
social issues outside the realm of education
work of members represented,
in the amount of

$ 22,753. 60

Local Leader
Special weekly mailings to affiliate presidents and monthly mailings to association
representatives in each building deal mostly
with leadership material in support of bargaining and representational issues. Occasional
information is carried on political action
efforts,
in the amount of

$

9,295.23

Reporter
Monthly newspaper is main vehicle for informing membership when political action activities
do take place. However, this is mainly done
in October endorsement issue. Last year 9.3
out of a total of 156 pages (670) was used
specifically for reporting on Political Action
endorsements. Special October issue prints
distributes organization's annual convention
program. This includes a small portion of
programming on controversial social issues outside the realm of education work of members
represented,
in the amount of

$ 16,965.16

Service to Other Divisions
Publications and media support is provided
for programs operated by other divisions,
some of which is beyond normal representational activity,
in the amount of

$ 10,838.04

For a total of

$118,381.67

I find that I need not recite the activities of the
Government Relations Division because all the activities of
that division consist of political activity, proscribed lobbying and government relations for which no part of an agency fee
may be used.
Therefore the full budget allocation and
expenditures of the Government Relations
Division are not related to collective
bargaining, contract administration or
grievance handling,
in the amount of

$534,554

INSTRUCTION AND TRAINING
INSTRUCTION AND TRAINING OFFICE
Provides for personnel costs of the
Instruction and Training Division, including the Professional Development
Institute.
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
To provide funds for the protection and
enhancement of professional rights; i.e.
teacher evaluation, compensatory education, affirmative action, minority involvement, tenure, certification, and assistance
to local associations.
INSTRUCTIONAL ACTIVITIES
To provide funds for activities related
to furtherance of educational quality, i.e.,
human relations, high school graduation requirements, violence and vandalism, migrant
education, environmental education, gifted
talented standards, exceptional children,
Good Ideas Conference, etc.
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT & IN-SERVICE
To provide funds for television in-service
series, cooperative projects with colleges
and other organizations and professional
development project feasibility study.
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
To provide funds for addressing emerging
critical issues and special activities; i.e.,
recertification, monitoring State Board of
Education, EIC's, and teacher centers.
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Provides funds for establishing the
components of the Institute (transcript
service, directory, endorsement of programs, registry, certificates of attendance, etc.) as operating services.
LEADERSHIP WORKSHOPS
To provide for speakers, facilities, postage, travel, meals, promotion, and materials
at various local leader conferences during
the year.
LEADERSHIP OPERATIONS
This is the basic training account. It
provides for materials, supplies, and
expenses for leadership training at the
local level. Included are the cost of
handbooks, new teacher kits, and cost of
providing the A/R Handbook.
SIMMER LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
To provide for speakers, facilities, postage, travel, meals, promotion, and materials
for Workshops I and II at Montclair State
College. Funds are also included for grants
to aid locals in sending Association representatives to the Workshop.
TRAINING CONSULTANTS
Provides for part-time training consultants
to assist locals in workshops of a professional nature.
CONVENTION PROGRAMS
Provides funds for programmatic expenses, staff
accommodations and meals, promotional activities
and materials, group meetings, dances and other
functions, printing and distribution of the program and directory and aid to affiliated groups.
I conclude that the following costs and expenditures are
not related to collective bargaining, contract administration
or grievance processing.
The job location service and the Impaired
School Employee Program,
in the amount of

$ 25,876

The costs of training on how to conform to
state regulations on record keeping,
in the amount of

„ .$ 31,505

-14The costs of the specialized services and
materials relating to the performance and
working conditions of the employee at the
worksite, which are available for members
only,
in the amount of

„..$ 27,888

One-third of the costs of meetings and materials relating to performance and working conditions of the employee at the worksite as imposed by State law and regulation
(available to members only),
in the amount of

$ 16,884

About 1070 of. the costs of the Summer Leadership Conference devoted to political activity,
in the amount of

.$

6,000

The total cost of programmatic expenses related to the annual NJEA convention (for
members only),
in the amount of

,$ 58,600
TOTAL

$166,753

BUSINESS DIVISION
BUSINESS OFFICE
Provides for personnel costs for the business office, as well as for temporary and
contracted help for total operations.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Provides for personnel, materials, supplies
and equipment costs for the accounting office.
COMPUTER CENTER
Provides for personnel, materials, supplies
and computer equipment and software amortization costs. Also included are funds for
the replacement of fully depreciated air
conditioning equipment.
MEMBERSHIP PROCESSING
Provides for personnel, contracted services,
membership processing reimbursement to locals,
supplies, materials, and postage for this
unit. The proposed amount includes funds
for improving the dues accounting system.
HEADQUARTERS' OPERATIONS
Provides for personnel, supplies and materials, taxes, mortgage amortization,
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rentals, custodial services, utilities,
and insurance for NJEA headquarters.
CAPITOL STREET OPERATIONS
Provides for personnel, supplies, and materials, taxes, maintenance, equipment
rental and replacement and servicing, utilities for the mail room, storage room and
space for NJEA Travel Service„
ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT
To provide kits and materials to be used
for the improvement of local organizational
management. Funds are also requested to
cover workshops for local officers; i.e.,
Presidents' and Treasurers' Workshops.
CONVENTION EXPOSITION
Provides for Convention Hall rental, decorating and drayage services, exhibit kits,
security and other facility related costs
in Atlantic City.
CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION
Provides for the renovation and rehabilitation of the NJEA Headquarters building. The
lower level is completed. The funds requested are to begin work on the upper levels. It
is anticipated that this will be a two year
project with additional funding needed from
next year's budget.
NEA CONVENTION
The amount proposed is based upon full funding for up to 450 state delegates, in addition to funds for operating, administrative,
and function expenses while at the Convention.
OFFICE AUTOMATION
Provides funds for the first phase of a three
phase computer network with NJEA Headquarters
and regional offices.
I conclude that the following costs and expenditures,
calculated primarily in the amount of time spent by staff of
|

this Division on matters unrelated to collective bargaining,
contract administration and grievance handling are:
2.8% of the time of the Director's office,
in the amount of

$

9,321

-164.97, of the time of the staff of Data Processing/Computer Center/Office Automation (for
political campaign purposes),
in the amount of

$ 30 ,062

11.47o of the time of the staff of the accounting
office (for political oriented transactions),
in the amount of

,$ 15,481

4.5% of the time of the staff of Membership
Processing, (for political campaign purposes),

in the amount of

$ 15,530

8.67 0 of the time of Capitol Street Operations
(for political activities),
in the amount of.

$ 28,449

Plus the net cost and expenses of the NJEA
Convention (for members only),
in the amount of

.$106,400

Plus overhead costs related to the foregoing,
in the amount of

$ 42,637
TOTAL

$246,880

The total foregoing excluded costs and expenditures during
the 1982-83 membership year total $1,522,800 or 9.437o of the
total NJEA budget and expenditures for that year.
I consider it logical and appropriate therefore to conclude that 9.437, of Governance and Administration division
budget is attributable to excluded activities, in the amount
of

$142,980, and that 9.437, of the Reserve

account be treated similarly, in the amount of

$59,840.
Accordingly, the total amount of expenditures during the

-171982-93 membership year that were unrelated to the statutory and/i
or judicially determined matters of collective bargaining, contract administration or grievance handling is $1,725.620.
This amount constitutes 10.68% of the total NJEA budget
and expenditures for the 1982-83 membership year.
DETERMINATION
10.68% of the total NJEA budget and expenditures for the 1982-83 membership year were
for activities statutorily or judicially determined to be unrelated to collective bargaining, contract administration or grievance processing, and may not be financed from representative or "agency" fees paid by non-members.
Conversely, 89.32% of the total budget and expenditures were used for permitted activities
on behalf of non-members as well as members.

As

the non-member paid an "agency" fee only 85% of
what a member paid in dues, I conclude that the
NJEA spent more for permitted activities on behalf of non-members (as well as members) than
non-members contributed toward those activities.
Inasmuch as the representative or "agency" fee
of a non-member was 15% less than the dues paid
by a member, it would appear that none of the
proscribed activities were paid for out of an
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agency fee.

Accordingly, non-members are

not entitled to refunds

Eric J. Schmertz
Representative Fee Umpire
DATED: January , 1984
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA
-AND- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers Union of America
AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Impartial
Chairman under the collective bargaining agreement between
the above named parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations

of said parties at a hearing on January 8, 1985,

makes the following AWARD:
The unsatisfactory nature of the attendance
record of George Sotomayor is incontestable.
He was previously counseled, warned and suspended,
and those actions were not challenged by Mr.
Sotomayor or by the Union.
I reiterate the standards and rules regarding
absenteeism and attendance violations which
I enunciated in the Rodriguez case.
Within the foregoing frame I shall accord
Mr. Sotomayor one final chance to achieve and
maintain a satisfactory attendance record.
In the instant case he was discharged following
his first violation of the attendance rules
subsequent to his one day suspension. Under the
facts of this case I think his explanation of
what happened is believable and that as a consequence he was unable to call in within the prescribed
time before the start of his shift. I shall give
him one more chance. However, if he fails or is
unable to maintain a satisfactory attendance record
or fails or is unable to comply with the attendance
rules within the requirements set forth in Rodriguez , he will be subject to summary discharge.
Accordingly, Mr. Sotomayor shall be reinstated but
without back pay. The period between his discharge
and his reinstatement shall be deemed a disciplinary
suspension and notice of his final chance referred
to herein.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: January 12, 1985
STATE of NEW YORK ) gg
COUNTY of BRONX
) "*

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
of AMERICA -and- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
betxveen
Local 100 Transport Workers Union
of American
OPINION AND AWARD
and
New York Bus Service

The issue is :
Was there just cause for the discharge
of Ivan Belfone? If not what shall be
the remedy?
Hearings were held on August 20 and December 3, 1984 at
which time Mr. Belfone, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant"
and representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evi-

dence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union and Employer filed

post-hearing statements and data.
The grievant is charged with having used marijuana "in
close proximity to his working hours" in violation of Appendix
A of the contract.

The pertinent part of Appendix A provides

that:
"If it is determined through appropriate
medical test that the employee ... used
marijuana ... during or in close proximity to his ... working hours, such employee
shall be subject to immediate discharge."
The medical test disclosed 3 nanograms of THC/ML in the
grievant's blood about 2% hours after he started his tour as a
bus driver.
The Employer asserts that that quantity of marijuana
in his blood is unrefutable evidence of having used the drug "in
close proximity" to his working hours.
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The Union contends that that quantity is insignificant;
that in that quantity it has no adverse physical or mental effect;
that the small quantity shows that the grievant's use of the
marijuana was earlier than in close proximity to his working
hours; and hence not violative of the contract proscription.
After my Award of October 24, 1983 regarding Peter
Spacek and William Spink, I frankly hoped that the parties, in
the then upcoming contract negotiations would agree on a contract provision which totally prohibited the use of marijuana
by bus drivers employed by the Employer, as a condition of
employment.
In that Award I stated:
"For two employees whose jobs were to drive
school buses with school children aboard,
the use of marijuana is indefensible and
reprehensible ... their gross irresponsibility when entrusted with the safety of
school children presently disqualifies
them from driving buses which transport
school children or any member of the riding
public." (emphasis added)
I went on to say:
"Indeed, if there was a promulgated rule in
this employment relationship totally prohibiting the use of marijuana or other controlled substances as a condition of employment or continued employment, I would unhesitatingly enforce that rule."
I further said:
"...this arbitrator will not now restore them
to that assignment" (i.e. driving buses with
passengers).
As the parties know I accepted a later formula in that
case which allowed the ultimate return of Spacek and Spink to
bus driving assignments, but in doing so I conditioned any such
arrangement and my granting of any such petition for restoration
on the requirement that:
"The public may be protected from any similar
or subsequent use by the grievants of marijuana
or other prohibited substances" (emphasis added).

-3By later negotiations the parties reached an agreement
under which Spacek and Spink could be restored to driving.

I

granted the petition for restoration because that arrangement
foreclosed the subsequent use of marijuana by Spacek and Spink.
They were subject to physical examination and both signed statements that they would not again use marijuana.
Hence the dicta of my Award and my view as Impartial
Chairman of what the safety of the riding public required, were
met.
But the parties did not do all that I hoped in the
negotiations leading to the current contract.

They negotiated

a clause which, inter alia does not prohibit the use of marijuana
at all times but only prohibits its use "in close proximity to
working hours."
Of course the parties have the absolute right to negotiate whatever they wish and can agree upon, and there is no need
that they follow the recommendations or urgings of the Impartial
Chairman.

Indeed, whatever they do agree upon is to what the

Chairman is bound and what he must enforce, regardless of his
own views.

But, just as the arbitrator should not substitute

his judgment for that of the parties on substantive provisions
of the contract, the arbitrator should not legislate contract
provisions to which the parties have not mutually agreed and
should not do so under the guise of contract interpretation or
application.
The responsibility for negotiating clear and enforceable contract terms is for the parties.
applies and interprets those terms.

The arbitrator enforces,

But where it is apparent

that a term did not have an agreed meaning when negotiated, and
where the absence of an agreement on meaning is the heart of the
arbitrable dispute, for the arbitrator to supply a meaning,
application or interpretation favorable to one side, would be to

-4legislate a contract term never mutually agreed to or jointly
understood.

In short, I do not think that an arbitrator can

legitimately apply a contract term when there was no meeting of
the minds of the parties or reasonable evidence of a meeting of
the minds, on the meaning of the term when negotiated.
That is what we have in the instant case, and it is
especially acute here, because an application or interpretation
of the phrase "in close proximity to working hours" has a direct
effect on the safety of the riding public.
The parties did not have a mutually agreed to understanding of what "close proximity to working hours" meant^.

Their

respective cases and the sharply divergent testimony and documentation of and by their experts makes it apparent that they
agree to contract language which meant different things to each
side.

The fact is, in my view, that the parties did not complete

their contract negotiations in that respect, because they had not
reached (and still have not reached) an agreement on the meaning
of what they wrote in the contract.
I conclude that the parties have a continuing

duty to

complete their negotiations by agreeing on contract terms that
represent a meeting of the minds, especially where as here a
third party interpretation in the form of a legislated answer,
bears on the public interest and safety.
With the expert testimony so divergent, I do not know
whether some or any quantity of marijuana found in the blood
during working hours means that the drug was used "in close
proximity to working hours" or whether the answer to that question turns on the quantity of marijuana

found.

Wherever the

answer lies I deem it the responsibility of the parties in the
first instance to fix the formula and degree.

Where the experts

disagree, and where the parties did not have anything

approaching
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a mutual understand when the imprecise language "in close
proximity" was negotiated, the responsibility to the public
interest and safety still resides with the parties and not
the arbitrator.
This is not to say that I will not interpret and
apply the language "in close proximity."

Rather it is to say

that I will consider doing so only after the parties have made
a better, more complete and good faith effort to negotiate a
jointly agreed to meaning or a mutually understood substitute,
and are unable to do so.

Then and only then should the Impartial

Chairman consider doing for the parties what they were unable
to do for themselves.

Here however, I conclude not that the

parties were unable to reach agreement on the meaning when the
clause was negotiated, but rather that they did not try, agreeing instead to disagree.
Accordingly I remand to the parties the matter of the
meaning of "in close proximity to working hours."

Pending

negotiations on the meaning, the language is just not subject
to enforcement, because any present enforcement would not
reflect an agreed upon or negotiated meaning, and standing
alone, the language has no

settled or commonly accepted

meaning.
What then is to be done about the grievant?

Under these

circumstances I find that he is entitled to no/ more or less
than Spacek and Spink, and that all three are sufficiently
similarly situated to be treated alike.

Therefore the grievant

This is distinguished from the prior contract which used
the well known phrase "under the influence" for both alcohol
and drugs. That phrase is and has been subject to interpretation and application, because it is discernible by
physical symptoms and settled medical and chemical analysis.
Not so with the phrase "close proximity" as applied to
marijuana. (Indeed what is its application to alcohol use?)
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shall be reinstated without back pay to a non-driving job or
assignment, and shall be paid the rate of any such job or
assignment.

After he has been off driving for at least a

period of time equal to the time that Spacek and Spink were
removed from driving, the Union on his behalf may petition me
to restore him to driving, provided he accepts and follows the
same arrangement that applied to Spacek and Spink, or another
arrangement that I consider achieves the same result.
My handling of Spacek, Spink and the grievant shall
not be construed in any respect as a precedent for any subsequent
situation or case.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 18, 1985
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss''
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION,
-and- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

J

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union of America
Local 100
AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Was Ivan Belfone properly paid as a shop employee
for the period April 2, 1985 to April 25, 1985
pursuant to the Award of March 18, 1985?
A hearing was held on July 29, 1985 at which time representatives of the parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity
to present their respective cases.
Based on the record before me I render the following AWARD:
Ivan Belfone was not improperly paid as a shop
employee for the period April 2, 1985 to April
25, 1985 pursuant to the Award of March 18, 1985.
The grievance is denied.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: July 30, 1985
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon rny Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS
UNION OF AMERICA -and- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers
Union of America
OPINION AND AWARD
and
New York Bus Service
The issue is whether there was just cause for the discharges of Peter Spacek and William Spink.
Hearings were held on June 30, July 22, August 5 and
August 19j 1983 at which time Messrs. Spacek and Spink, hereinafter referred to as the "grievants" and representatives of
the above named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

A stenographic record was

taken; the Arbitrator's Oath was waived; and both sides filed a
post-hearing brief.
The Company has proved to my satisfaction that both
grievants actively used marijuana during or in close proximity
to the time of their regularly scheduled runs as drivers of
school buses.
For two employees whose jobs were to drive school buses
with school children aboard, the use of marijuana is indefensible
and reprehensible.

Indeed, their gross irresponsibility when

entrusted with the safety of school children presently disqualifies
them from driving buses which transport school children or any
member of the riding public.
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Though denying the instant charge, both grievants do
admit their prior and at least casual use of marijuana.

My

view is that there is a reasonable probability that their use
may have exceeded what they have admitted (including my finding
that they used it in the instant situation as alleged by the
Company).

I think it not unreasonable for the Company to guard

against the possibility

that they may be addicted and hence

capable of using larger doses of marijuana, again at times
during or prohibitively close to their work schedules, if
permitted to return to their jobs as bus drivers.
The Company, which provides franchised bus service for
the public had reasonable grounds to believe that the grievants
may have been "under the influence" of marijuana and therefore
had reasonable grounds to remove them from bus driving.

And it

follows therefore that the Company should not be required to run
the risk of presently continuing the grievants as bus drivers.
Indeed, if there was a promulgated rule in this employment relationship totally prohibiting the use of marijuana or
other controlled substances as a condition of employment or
continued employment, I would unhesitatingly enforce that rule.
But there is no such rule or contractual provision, and
that is the problem

with the Company's decision to discharge

the grievants.
The Company has the burden in this case of establishing
cause, not for the removal of the grievants from bus driving,
but for their discharge.
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My interpretation of Section 33 of the contract gives
the Company the right to discharge or suspend an employee "for
being under the influence of .... narcotics ...." If a medical
examination finds the employee "to not have been under the
influence of ...narcotics" he UT made whole for wages lost and
no discipline is imposed.
In the instant case, though the Company has proved that
the grievants used marijuana, it has not proved clearly and
convincingly that they were under "the influence of marijuana"
1
within the well settled meaning of that phrase. "Under the
influence" means to me a use of marijuana in sufficient quantity
to impair senses, reflexes, alertness and judgment or to alter
ones physical or psychological demeanor thereby adversely affecting the normal ability to drive a bus safely.
In the instant case, this contract proscription has not
been shown.
The expert testimony and authoritative writings submitted
into evidence regarding the effect on reflexes, demeanor, senses,
and judgment from the two nanograms of THC per milliliter and the

1. One can debate endlessly whether marijuana is a "narcotic."
I am satisfied that when that word was negotiated into Section
33 of the contract the parties meant and intended to include
marijuana, the differing scientific and medical views not withstanding.

-4six nanograms of THC per milliliter of serum found respectively
in Spacek's and Spink's blood are conflicting, indeterminative
and hence inconclusive.

Like an alcohol content of less than

statutorily recognized level of impairment, I cannot conclude
that the foregoing levels of active marijuana ingredients in the
grievants' blood were sufficient to cause "impairment" or "being
under the influence."
Moreover there is no evidence in the record of objective
symptoms of "impairment." Aside from the blood samples, there is
no probative evidence of the physical condition of the grievants
or any outward symptoms (such as condition of eyes, speech, gait
or demeanor) which could be deemed associated with the use of
marijuana.

Indeed the only testimony on this point was that the

grievants appeared physically normal.
The question then is, under the particular circumstances
of this case, and especially the language of Section 33 of the
contract, what shall be the appropriate decision, penalty and/or
remedy?
I have already held that the Company and the riding public
should not bear the risk of the return of the grievants to driving
buses with passengers.

Put another way this Arbitrator will not

now restore them to that assignment.
However, as also indicated, I cannot find that the Company
had a contractual right to discharge the grievants in view of the
failure to prove "impairment" and the explicit conditions of
2
Section 33.

2. Under those circumstances I do not find a statutory basis that
is controlling or which preempts the contract application and
interpretation.
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Obviously, under the foregoing findings, the grievants
are entitled to reemployment, but are not entitled to drive a
bus carrying passengers.

A resolution or reconciliation of

these circumstances is found in what I regularly did when I was
the disciplinary Hearing Officer at the New York City Transit
Authority in similar situations involving bus drivers and motormen .
The grievants are to be restored to the Company's employ
without back pay.

Back pay is denied because of their gross

irresponsibility and disregard for the safety aspects of their
jobs.

They shall be assigned by the Company to jobs that do not

involve driving the public and shall be paid, from the date of
their reemployment, at the rate of the job to which they are
assigned.
I retain jurisdiction over the application and implementation of this case.

The grievants are not barred forever from

returning to bus driving.

That question may be a matter for

discussion by the parties in the upcoming contract negotiations.
Also, after the passage of some time, and consistent with the
provisions of the contract and any proper rules that may then be
in effect, the Union may petition the Impartial Chairman to
restore the grievants to jobs as regular bus drivers, and for
rulings of how, if the petition is granted, the Company and the
public may be protected from any similar or subsequent use by the
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grievants of marijuana or other prohibited substances.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: October 24, 1983

E F l l C J. S C H M E R T Z

P. C.
HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
HEMPSTEAD, NEW YORK M55O
(516) 5SO-S85A

February

18, 1985

Bernard M. Byrne, Esq.
New York Telephone Company
1095 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036
John Keefe, Esq.
Communications Workers of Amerire-a
80 Pine Street
New York, New York 10005
Re:

CWA -and- New York Telephone
Combined Grievances
Suspension and Final Warning of
E. Dressier
N.Y. Telco Case No. A-83-176 & 177

Gentlemen:
I enclose to you each herewith, two duly executed copies
of my Award and Opinion in the above matter, together with my bill
for services and expenses.
Very truly yours,

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
EJS:hls
Encl.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communication Workers of America
OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Telephone Company

The stipulated issue is:
Whether James Harris was suspended for
just cause?
A hearing was held on December 14, 1984 at which time
Mr. Harris, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The grievant was suspended for three days for "unsatisfactory job performance."

Specifically he is charged with a

failure to pressure test and bootstrap the cables in a manhole
at 65th Street and Madison Avenue.

He was assigned that work;

he reported its completion on the evening of August 13, 1982
and the manhole was closed at that time.
On Monday August 16th, a cable failure and outage occurred.
It was traced to a cracked cable in the 65th Street-Madison
Avenue manhole.
It is the Company's claim that the cable would not have
cracked on August 16th had the grievant pressure tested every
cable and properly racked them on August 13th as direct.

Pressure

testing would have uncovered any leak or defect, and the failure
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and outage would not have taken place.

The Company concludes

that the grievant did not do his job properly or completely.
The grievant claims he did everything required; that he
pressure tested and bootstrapped every cable; that his assignment was completed when he closed the manhole and left on
August 13th; that the cable crack must have resulted from some
work or activity in the manhole between August 13th and August
16th; and that therefore he is not responsible for the cable
failure.
There is no official record of any Company or other
authorized work having been done in that manhole between August
13th and August 16th.

However a Union witness testified that

he saw from a distance an unmarked white truck at the hole and
believed it was a cable TV truck.

The Union suggests that this

or some other authorized or unauthorized work carried out in the
manhole after the grievant completed his assignment is responsible for the cable crack.
The assertion that someone else was in the manhole between
August 13th and August 16th is not persuasively established.
The "white truck" was not identified and the witness who observed
it did not go close enough to see what, if anything was being
done or even if it involved opening that manhole at all.

The

official records show no activity in that manhole by any authorized source, during the critical period.
If there had been no intervening factors during the period
August 13th to August 16th, then, as a disciplinary matter, I

-3would find that the Company had the reasonable right to draw a
proximate cause and effect conclusion between what the grievant
was supposed to do on August 13th and the cable failure on August
16th.

And I would consider it logical and reasonable for the

Company to conclude that the failure would not have happened and
the cable defect would have been discovered had the grievant
pressure tested all the cables as he was instructed to do.
But, while I am doubtful that there is adequate probative
proof of some other work in or entry into that manhole after the
grievant finished his job, I need not authoritatively resolve
that question.

Rather, I conclude that the issue is determined

by what the grievant said during the Company's investigation.
It is the testimony of the Company's Manager of Cable
Maintenance that when asked whether he had pressure tested and
re-racked all the cables, the grievant responded first that he
"did not," and then stated that he "didn't remember if I did or
did not."
At the arbitration hearing the grievant testified, and
though he claimed that he did pressure test and re-rack the
cables he did not deny that he gave the foregoing answers to
his manager.
I find no reason why the manager would falsify what the
grievant told him at the scene of the cable failure on August
16th, and I conclude that the grievant's failure to deny any such
answers when he testified at the arbitration, leaves those answers
standing as "admissions against interest" and probatively

-4reflective of what actually happened.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
James Harris was suspended for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: January 11, 1985
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York ) '"
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IN THE MATTER OF THE A R B I T R A T I O N
BETWEEN
COMMUNICATIONS W O R K E R S OF A M E R I C A
OPINION AND A W A R D
AND
NEW YORK TELEPHONE COMPANY

The stipulated issue is:
Was the suspension and final warning of
Eric Dressier for proper reason?
The grievant is charged with falsification of work
records, more particularly a "false and mischevious" report
to supervision that he had not been issued certain trouble
tickets - causing the reissuance of those tickets - when in
fact his log showed he had received them at initial issuance
and had worked on them; and insubordination by his failure to
comply with a directive of his foreman to call at 1 PM for an
additional work assignment.
The Company cites the grievant's prior disciplinary
record, which includes work infractions in May and June of
1982,

and argues that the instant suspension

of two days and

two hours and the final warning were justified.
The Company characterizes the grievant as a "wise guy,"
"disruptive," and "unimpressed... with the need to employ candor
and fairness in dealing with his employer."

This may be so

with regard to the grievant's prior disciplinary record, but
the Company's evidence in the instant case falls short of the
clear and convincing standard required in disciplinary matters.
The grievant's explanation of his conversation with his foreman regarding the trouble tickets is plausible.

At least it

leaves a. reasonable inference that the grievant misunderstood
what was being asked of him.

He testified that when asked about

-2progress on the trouble tickets he replied "what tickets" because the specific tickets were not identified by number in
the inquiry.

He denies that he said that he "never received

the tickets."

The grievant testified under oath that he has a

hearing loss.

My observations of him tend to support that

testimony.

While he presented no medical proof of a hearing

impairment, the Company offered nothing in rebuttal.

I think

it entirely possible, and probatively so in a discipline case,
for the grievant not to have fully heard or understood what
was asked of him on the phone by his foreman regarding work
progress on certain trouble

tickets.

Indeed I see no reason why the grievant would verbally
falsify the work records when his own work logs would show
otherwise.

Frankly, a failure of communication is as much a

probable explanation as anything else.
With regard to the 1 PM phone call he was to make, the
grievant denies he was so instructed.
pairment may have been the cause.

Again, the hearing im-

Also, based on the foreman's

own testimony, I cannot conclude that the grievant was given
"instructions" or a "directive" to call at 1 PM.

Foreman

Colabella testified that he asked the grievant "to please call
back the dispatcher at 1 PM and pick up a ticket."

Whether or

not that wording is an order demanding strict compliance at 1 PM
is questionable.

Of course, a work instruction can be prefaced

by "please" and still be binding, but, it is also ambiguous as
to its mandatory nature and hence equivocal as a basis for
discipline.

Here I cannot find unquestionably, that the grie-

vant received and understood an order to call the dispatcher
at precisely 1 PM.
When he did not call, supervision paged him.

When he

didn't respond until 1:30 PM, the Company concluded that he was
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improperly away from his work place (and probably had overstayed his lunch break.)
supposition.

The evidence does not support this

The grievant testified that he was "pulling wires;"

a fellow employee testified that he was working with the grievant pulling wires at the time; and there is credible evidence
in the record that the paging system in that area cannot be
well heard or understood.
All of the foregoing is not to say that the grievant did
not act (or fail to act) as alleged by the Company, but rather
that the evidence in support of any such concludsion falls
short of the requisite persuasiveness to sustain the discipline.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The suspension and final warning of
Eric Dressier were not for proper
reasons.

E r i c J / Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED:
February 18, 1985
STATE OF New York
ss . :
COUNTY OF New York
I, Eric J. Schmertz to hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my A W A R D .

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communications Workers of America
AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
CWA Case #l-84-56L
NYTEL Case #A-85-l4

and
New York Telephone Company

On November 20, 1984, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB involving the facts which are the subject of this arbitration.

The Board administratively deferred

the charge to arbitration pursuant to its policy under Collyer
Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971) .

As a consequence of the

deferral, this arbitration proceeding was held pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement between Communications Workers of
America, AFL-CIO and New York Telephone Company, effective August
7, 1983.
A hearing was held before the Undersigned, on June 11, 1985,
at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbi-

trator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record taken, and both
sides filed post-hearing briefs.
THE ISSUE
The parties failed to agree on the precise wording of the
issue.

Based on the record I deem the issue to be:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement between the parties when
it refused to process a grievance presented
by Local 1153 of the Union on behalf of Company employee members of Local 1153 who worked in Westchester County insisting instead
that it need process such grievances only if
presented by Local 1103? If so what shall be
the remedy?

THE FACTS
The facts in this case are straightforward and essentially
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undisputed.

The legal significance of those facts under the terms

of the collective bargaining agreement is the core question.
In the spring of 1984, Local 1153 filed a grievance on behalf of one of its members employed by the Company in Westchester
County.

A grievance number was issued by the Company, which re-

flected the fact the grievance was filed by Local 1153.

The first

step of the grievance procedure under section 11.02 of the collective bargaining agreement was completed by the participation of a
foreman on behalf of the Company and a Local 1153 shop steward.
The grievance was not resolved at the Step 1 level, and when Local
1153 sought to continue the contractual grievance process at Step
2, the Company refused to entertain the grievance on the grounds
that it was not contractually obligated to consider a grievance
filed by Local 1153.

Rather, the Company claimed, Local 1103 was

the appropriate Local under the contract to file a grievance on
behalf of employees working in Westchester regardless of the local
in which the employees held membership.

The facts concerning the

grievance were not in evidence at the hearing and both sides agreeji
they were not material to the determination of this proceeding.
DISCUSSION
Both sides agree that the Communications Workers of America
is the sole and exclusive representative for the unit which includes the employee involved in this grievance.

Conversely, they

agree that the CWA locals are not parties to the collective bargaining agreement and that the decision in this arbitration,
whether for the Union or the Company, will not change the identity
of the bargaining representative.

It will continue to be the

Communications Workers of America.
Section 11.02 of the collective bargaining agreement
provides:
All grievances shall be presented by the
appropriate authorized representative of
the parties to this Agreement at a time

-3and place mutally agreeable to the parties
in accordance with the steps outlined below:
1st Step—The grievance shall be initially
presented to the appropriate authorized representative of the parties or their alternates
at the immediate supervisory level of the Company and the steward level of the Union. The
grievance review shall be held promptly after
appropriate investigation of the facts, and a
reply given within seven (7) calendar days from
the time of its initial presentation. The management spokesman shall be the person at the immediate supervisory level. A management representative at the second supervisory level (subdistrict)
may be in attendance at these reviews and at
those times he shall be the management spokesman. The parties will seek in good faith to resolve the grievance at this step, and to this
end the review will be informal. Both the presentation of the grievance and the reply will be
verbal.
If a grievance involves a discharge, a demotion,
or a suspension of an employee for five (5) days
or more, the 1st Step shall be waived at the request of the Local Union and the grievance presented initially at the 2nd Step.
The Company will submit to each Local Union a
monthly summary of all first step grievances,
filed by each such Local Union, showing for
each grievance the grievance number, the subject, the grievant, the date heard, the Company
supervisor who heard the grievance and the disposition of each such grievance.
2nd Step-If not satisfactorily settled at the first
step, the grievance may be appealed in writing to
the designated authorized representative of the
parties within seven (7) days after receiving the
reply in the first step. The appeal shall set
forth the act or occurrence complained of and, if
the grievance involves a claimed contract violation,
the Article alleged to have been violated.
If a grievance involves a discharge, a demotion,
or a suspension of an employee for five (5) days
or more, the grievance shall be reviewed at the
district or division level of the Company with a
representative in the field at the district level
of the Company or his alternate being present, and
with the Local President or his designated alternate
above the steward level of the Union.
All other grievances shall be reviewed at the district or division level of the Company with a Company representative in the field present, and with
the Local President or his designated alternate above the steward level of the Union. The review of
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all grievances shall be held within nine (9)
calendar days from the time the written appeal
is received. The Company shall mail or deliver
a written reply giving the reason for its decision, by the seventh (7th) calendar day following the review of the grievance.
3rd Step-If not satisfactorily settled at the 2nd
Step, the grievance may be appealed in writing to
the authorized representative of the parties withing ten (10) days after the reply in the 2nd Step
is received. The grievance review shall be at the
Assistant Vice President-Labor Relations level of
the Company and the Area Director level of the
Union or their designated representatives. If a
grievance involves a discharge, a demotion or a
suspension of an employee for five (5) days or more,
the Company representative in the field at the division level of the Company or his alternate shall
be present at the grievance review. A review of
all grievances shall be held within fourteen (14)
caldendar days from the time the written appeal is
received. The Company shall mail or deliver a written
reply giving the reason for its decision, by the
seventh (7th) calendar day following the review of
the grievance.
The Company claims that under the contract it is obligated
to process grievances only if they are filed by Local 1103 and not
by Local 1153 for Company employees working in Westchester. The
Agreement between the parties designates the "geographic jurisdiction" of CWA locals for various purposes, including the process
ing of grievances.

The grievance in this case involves an em-

ployee in Westchester County and 1103 is the appropriate Local
under the contract to file a grievance.

The Company relies on a

chart appended to the Agreement (Jt. Exh. No. 1, pp. 235-237) which
is entitled, "CWA LOCALS CHARTER JURISDICTION."
tains two columns.

The chart con-

The first column is designated, "Locals," and

the second, "Jurisdiction."

Local 1103 appears on the chart in

the first column and "Westchester County, Greenwich, Connecticut
and the portion of Putnam County falling in the Company's downstate area" appears in the jurisdiction column opposite Local 1103
Local 1153 does not appear on the chart at all.

During the arbi-

tration the parties agreed that the chart was included at the
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Union's request.

The Company argues that the "list of Locals

that the parties agreed to pursuant to the Union's demand in
bargaining constitutes the only authorized representatives whom
the Company is required to deal with in matters involving administration of the Agreement absent a modification in writing signed
by the parties pursuant to Article 30," (Co. Brief p. 12) and
concludes that it need only process a grievance by 1103 for this
employee.

It states it would process a grievance from 1153 if

1153 was designated an agent of 1103 and acted in that capacity.
Article 30 precludes effective waiver or modification of
the contract except by a writing signed by the parties.

The Com-

pany contends that adopting the Union's view would constitute a
modification that does not comply with Article 30 and thereby
affords the Union a benefit which it has not achieved through
negotiation.
The Company denies any purpose to interfere with the internal
local affairs of the Union but claims the concept of "geographic
jurisdiction" for the processing of grievances is part and parcel
of the contract.

The Company argues that the Communications

Workers of America (CWA) itself has recognized a distinction between an employee's membership in a Local for internal Union purposes and the "geographic jurisdiction" of a Local for purposes
of administration of the collective bargaining agreement.

In this

connection, the Company relies on a letter to the Company by Mr.
Larry Mancino, Area Director of the CWA, dated May 18, 1984.
Exhibit 2A).

(Co.

The letter is concerned with the Company's refusal

to follow the Local 1153 schedule for deduction of dues for Local
1153 members working in Westchester and the Union's position that
the Local 1153 dues deduction schedule should be followed and not
that for Local 1103.

The Company, in response, denied any obliga-

tion other than to follow the dues deduction schedule certified
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for 1103.

(Co. Exhbit 2-B).

The specific issue of the proper

dues deduction on schedule is not involved in this proceeding.
However, the Company points to the following language in the
Mancino letter as evidence of the Union's recognition of the concept of "geographic jurisdiction."

"They [the 1153 employees

transferred from AT&T to New York Telephone by virtue of divestiture] are presently within the geographical jurisdiction of Local
1103.

However, they are still members of Local 1153."
In further support of its construction of the contract, the

Company points to possible consequences of a requirement that it
process grievances from Local 1153.

It expresses concern over the

impact of such a ruling on dues collection, the problem of knowing
which Local to notify in the event of a discharge

(Article 10.01),

provisions concerned with overtime and a list of other matters
involved in the administration of the contract which "involve
interaction with the Local" (Co. Brief p.5; Tr. pp.23-25).

While

conceding that only Article 11 is involved in this proceeding, the
Company argues that the "havoc" that a ruling favorable to the
Union could create in these other areas provides a basis for adopt
ing the Company's position.

As for Article 11 itself, the Company

claims that a ruling favorable to the Union would mean that the
Company "would be faced with the prospect of acquiescing to any
other Union Local (in processing grievances) not listed in the
agreement."
The Company also relies on Article 4 of the agreement which
it claims requires the Company be provided with written advice of
names of representatives of the Union Locals (Article 4.03).

The

Company states that it only had written notice of the 1103 shop
steward and no written notice with respect to Local 1153.
The Company also argues that past practice has been to have
the Union Local listed in the chart represent employees transferred from other Bell System Companies.

The Company points to
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the fact that the Union was aware there would be transfers due to
the divestiture and failed to negotiate with respect to those
transfers and the concept of a geographic jurisdiction.
The Union, for its part, resists the claim that 1153 can
act only as an agent of 1103 for the purpose of processing grievances.

The Union points out that the term "geographic juris-

diction" does not appear in the contract and no similar term or
its equivalent appears in Article 11.

Indeed, the body of the

contract nowhere refers to the chart. In addition, the Union
asserts that where geographic boundaries are material to rights
and obligations under the contract there are provisions which
specifically deal with those boundaries, (e.g. Articles 8.02,
14.03, 2.02).

In contrast, Article 11 does not refer to geographic

boundaries at all.

Further, the Company previously has processed

grievances from Local 1101 for its members working in Westchester
and not as an agent for 1103, and it has processed grievances from
Local 1102 (Staten Island) for its members transferred to Brooklyn
(Local 1109).
OPINION
I conclude that Article 11 does not incorporate a concept
of "geographic jurisdiction" which permits the Company to refuse
to process a grievance by a Local on behalf of its members working in an area unless that Local appears on the chart appended to
the contract with the applicable geographic jurisdiction.

Article

11, by its terms, contains no such limitations and in the absence
of a contractual limitation on the power of the Union to designate
who will file grievances, the Company's position would not prevail.

The fact is that the Recognition Clause (Preamble and

Article 1) accords recognition to the Communications Workers of
America and does not specify particular local unions.

It is un-

disputed that Local 1153 is a chartered Local of the parent Union,
and therefore, at best from the Company's position, there is a
possible ambiguity if the chart relied on by the Company is taken
into account.

Considering the importance of the matter to the

Union's internal affairs, i.e., who may require the Company to
process a grievance, and the Recognition Clause, the evidence
should be more compelling than it is that the Union surrendered
this usual and important power to designate representatives in
the grievance process before it is concluded the Union's power
has been so circumscribed.
I do not hold there is an ambiguity.

However, if there is,

the following factors militate in favor of the Union's position:
(1) There are provisions which specifically address and
define geographic boundaries.

Article II is not one of those

provisions.
(2) There are examples, albeit limited, in which the Company
did and does process grievances by Locals outside the so-called
"geographic jurisdiction."

Here, I rely on these practices not

as waiver or estoppel of the Company or as modification of the
agreement, but rather as evidence of the parties' view of the
meaning of an ambiguity, if there is an ambiguity.

The Company

argues that those instances differ from the instant one because
Locals 1101, 1103, 1102 and 1109 were listed on the Chart and
1153 is not listed.

This is not persuasive.

It does not address

the issue of limiting geographic jurisdiction at all but imposes
a further limit, that the Union Local must appear on the list.
This would or could mean a Local could not be abolished, merged
or its charter otherwise modified insofar as administration of
the contract is concerned.
so drastic a limitation.

Surely, so slim a basis cannot support
I do not rely on the NYNEX practice citec

by the Union which involves a different contract with different
terms.
(3) The chart relied on by the Union merely describes
the charter jurisdiction of the listed Locals.

The reference

to "geographic jurisdiction" in the Mancino letter relied on by
the Company is a clear reference to the charter jurisdiction, an
internal union matter, and not "geographic jurisdiction" for the
purposes of administering the contract.
(4) As for the Company's practice of processing grievances
by the local with so-called "geographic jurisdiction" and not the
employee's own local involving other Bell System employees transferred to the Company, the record is sparse.

However, it does

appear that the issue was not raised with respect to those employees and that the respective Union charters

may have required j

or permitted this to occur as an internal Union matter.

In con-

trast, in a case where the issue was raised as in the 1103/1101
situation, the charter required 1101 to file the grievance and
the Company processed it.

The testimony of record is that the

relevant charters give 1153 and not 1103 the authority to process
grievances for its members.
(5) Administrative difficulties in permitting 1153 to process grievances are not that burdensome and in no significant way
prejudicial despite the Company's expression of concern.

An ex-

pression of "concern" is not material to the contract determination of this proceeding.
Article 4 deals with "Promotion and Transfers of Union
Representatives."

It restricts the Company's power to promote

or transfer certain designated Union officials in a manner which
will affect that status without the Union's consent and requires
the Union be given notice of such promotion and transfer.

The
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provision relied on by the Company appears in Article 4 and
obviously is designed to protect the Company should it promote
or transfer a Union official without having adequate notice of
the official's status.

It is not applicable to the situation in-

volved in this proceeding and, in any event, the absence of
written notice has had no effect on the Company's action because
it claims that even written notice would not require it to process grievances from 1153.

Moreover the evidence indicates that

the Company representatives knew who the Local 1153 steward was
and indeed dealt with him at Step 1.
In sum, then, I conclude that Article 11 by its terms
determines the organizational

level of the participants in

grievances and is not modified by the chart so as to impose a
further limit of "geographic jurisdiction" on the identity of
the Union representatives

in the grievance process.

Consequently,

the Company violated the collective bargaining agreement when it
refused to proceed with Step 2 of the grievance procedure initiated by Local 1153 for its members working in Westchester County.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
New York Telephone Company violated Article
II of the collective bargaining agreement
between the parties by its refusal to process the grievance filed by Local 1153. The
Company is directed to process the grievance
at Step 2 and thereafter, in accordance with
the contract grievance procedure.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 14,1985
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss':
I, Eric J. Schmertz to hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Steamfitters Local Union No. 475
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1830 0616 84N

and
Pabst Brewing Company,
Newark, New Jersey

In accordance with Article V of the collective bargaining
agreement effective May 1, 1983 between the above-named Union
and Employer, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator
to hear and decide a dispute concerning the propriety of the
discharge of the grievant, William Kearney.
A hearing was held at the offices of the Employer in Newark,
New Jersey on January 24, 1985 at which time representatives of
the Union and Employer appeared and were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The grievant attended the hearing.

Oath was waived.

The Arbitrator's

A stenographic record was taken.

waived the use of a tripartite arbitration board.

The parties
The parties

filed post-hearing briefs.
BACKGROUND
The Company employed the grievant, William Kearney, as a
steamfitter since May 15, 1968.

The Company discharged him on

June 28, 1983 for an assault involving another employee on June
19, 1983.

The Company converted the discharge into a disciplin-

ary suspension pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement dated August
12, 1983.

The Memorandum of Agreement accepted by the Union and

the grievant, contained the following provisions regarding the
reemployment of the grievant:

-21.

He will accordingly adhere to the contract
regarding rest and lunch periods.

2.

He will not be involved in any assaults,
fights, threats, coercive or intimidating
conduct towards any employee.

3.

He will abide by the rules and regulations
of the Company.

On the morning of October 2, 1984,

the grievant's

foreman,

Edward F. Carolan, directed the grievant to check the heating
system on certain floors in Building Six, including the fifth
floor.

John Ehrmann, the General Plant Manager for the Newark

Division, inspecting certain areas of the warehouse saw the
grievant, who had been alone on the fifth floor, get up from a
pallet located among rows of packaging materials.

Following an

investigation of this incident, the Company discharged the grievant on October 19, 1984.
CONTENTIONS OF THE COMPANY
The Company asserts that the grievant violated the terms of
the Memorandum of Agreement and that the discharge therefore was
proper.

The Company characterizes the Memorandum of Agreement as

a "last chance" reinstatement that the Company agreed to because
of the grievant's length of service.

It is the position of the

Company that the grievant took an unauthorized rest break on
October 2, 1984 by lying down on two low stacks of pallets in a
secluded area of the plant.

The Company relies upon the testimon

of the General Plant Manager that the grievant admitted his guilt
by reacting as if he had been "caught in the act."

The Company

asserts that the grievant offered a series of excuses that are
unbelievable, including that he had taken diet pills; that he had
not slept properly at night; and that he was listening for calls.
The Company also claims that the grievant requested Ehrmann to
overlook the incident. The Company insists that the discharge
should be sustained on this independent ground because the

-3grievant's conduct constituted a specific breach of the provision
of the Memorandum of Agreement dealing with unauthorized rest
periods.
However, the Company further contends that the grievant's
poor attendance record provides another independent basis for
sustaining the discharge.

In this regard the Company maintains

that the grievant abused Plant Rule E.8 (excessive absenteeism
and tardiness) by a record of 16 absences, 28 early departures,
and 24 latenesses over a 14 month period.

The Company points to

the grievant's failure to change this pattern after a verbal
warning froir Armond La Rocca, the Assistant Plant Engineer and
Maintenance Engineer, in mid-September 1984 concerning the grievant's attendance record--which constituted the worst one of the
steamfitters.
In addition, the Company argues that the grievant's admission
that he had taken a prescription drug without notifying the Medical Department violated Company Rule F.7.c. and therefore provided an additional independent basis for the discharge.
CONTENTIONS OF THE UNION
The Union asserts that the grievant did not violate any rules
regarding absenteeism.

The Union notes that the normal attendanc

rules did not apply to steamfitters because their work schedule
covered six to seven days of work each week.

According to the

Union, the records introduced as Company Exhibit 7 do not confirm
a record of excessive absenteeism insofar as they indicate eight
absences from January 1, 1984 through October 7, 1984 which is
within the seven to ten absences that the Company recognizes as
being normal.

Thus the Union insists that a discharge for ex-

cessive absenteeism was unwarranted.

The Union also contends

that the grievant's record of early leaving was a common and
accepted practice for steamfitters and that the grievant sought

-4and obtained persmission each time before leaving early.

With

respect to tardiness, it is the opinion of the Union that the
grievant's record does not reveal a tardiness problem and that
the Company failed to notify the grievant of a tardiness problem
before the October 2, 1984 incident.
The Union insists that the grievant did not take an unauthorized rest period on October 2, 1984.
located a valve on the fifth

It claims that he

floor that he could not check with-

out using a ladder; that he went to the elevator to go to the
floor from where a ladder could be obtained; that someone was
using the elevator; that he decided to get a drink of water from
a water fountain while he waited for the elevator to arrive; and
that he did not feel well at that point so he sat on the pallets
for a moment.

According to the Union the grievant planned to

wait for the elevator for five minutes and, if it did not arrive,
to walk down to the floor to obtain the ladder.

The Union

stresses that the grievant sat on the pallet for only two or
three minutes and therefore the "incident" was very minor.

In

fact, the Union suggests that the Company was motivated by a
desire to "get" the grievant due to ongoing animosity that stemmed
from the incident that culminated with the Memorandum of Agreement.

For all of these reasons, the Union contends that the

discharge was not justified.
OPINION
The parties failed to stipulate a precise issue to be resolve
in the instant case.

Based on the record, I deem the issue to be:

Was the discharge of William Kearney for
just cause? If not, what shall be the
remedy?
It is undisputed that the parties and the grievant bound
themselves to the Memorandum of Agreement dated August 12, 1983.
All parties signed it.

Pursuant to that Agreement the grievant

-5pledged, inter alia, that: "He will accordingly adhere to the
contract regarding rest and lunch periods."

That this provision

was a material part of the Agreement is clear due to the prior
sentence, namely, that: "Upon his [the grievant's] return to work
he will be conditionally employed under the following terms."
A breach of the condition would therefore abrogate the Agreement
and the grievant would revert to his status of, or be subject to
discharge.
Thus the issue in the instant case narrows at the outset to
whether the October 2, 1984 incident furnishes a basis for the
discharge.
does.

Based upon the evidence it is my judgment that it

The grievant admitted that he sat down at the pallets at

a location some 40 feet from the elevator.

He was not on an

authorized rest period.
I find nothing in the record which would suggest the view
that Plant Manager Ehrmann falsified his testimony.

Therefore,

I accept as truthful and accurate Ehrmann's testimony that the
grievant asked him to ignore the incident.

That is not the reques

of an employee who has done nothing wrong; nor is it consistent
with the grievant's defense of illness.
With his prior disciplinary record, and particularly in view
of the express conditions of the Memorandum, the grievant had a
special duty of prudence and care, to comply precisely with the
terms of his prior reinstatement.

He should not have put himself

in a position where a logical and reasonable interpretation of
his acts and conduct would be the conclusion that he violated the
Memorandum.

If, as he claims, he was waiting for the elevator to

get a ladder, he should not have located himself some distance from
the elevator, relying on the questionable noise or "clicks" of the
elevator to tell him when it had arrived at the fifth floor.
should have been at the elevator location tending to his job.

He
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If he felt ill, he should not have sat down on the pallets
nor placed himself in an out of the way location.

Instead he

should have immediately reported his illness to supervision and
requested assistance or relief.

If he was on medication this too

should have been reported to the Company, at least when he felt
ill.

In short, the grievant's version of the events is inconsis-

tent with his plea for leniency; is inconsistent with what an
employee would and should do if there was truth to his version;
and most significantly, is contrary to the care and responsibility
imposed on the grievant by virtue of the mitigation of his earlier
discharge and the strict conditions of his reemployment.

I con-

clude that the grievant was loafing on the job, took an unauthorized break from his duties and thereby violated the rules which
he had agreed to.
On balance, I am persuaded, with that conclusion, that the
Company has met the burden required of it in a discharge case.
The balance of the allegations against the grievant need not be
addressed.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of William Kearney was for
just cause.

DATED: April 17, 1985
STATE OF New York)
COUNTY OF New York) ss - :

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.

AWARD

and

Precision Film Labs, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Permanent
Arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement between the above named parties, and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the following AWARD:
As of August 31, 1983 Precision Film
Labs, Inc. owes the Local 702 Pension
Fund the sum of FOUR HUNDRED AND TWO
DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS
($402.50).
As of August 31, 1983 Precision Film
Labs, Inc. owes the Local 702 Welfare
Fund the sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
AND SIX DOLLARS AND SEVENTY TWO CENTS....
($2,506.72).

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: February 11, 1985
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) "
'
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I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

Voluntary Labor Arbitration

ADMINISTRATOR

Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 450, Gas Manufacturing

Workers

A W A R D
Case #1839 0370 83D

and
Public Service Electric and Gas Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties make the following AWARD:

1.

The Employer wrongfully refused to
accept the instant grievance dated
May 9, 1983.

2.

The Employer did not violate the
collective bargaining agreement by
assigning employees of its Harrison
Gas Plant to perform work at the West
End Gas Plant.

DATED: January 9, 1985
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

On this ninth day of January, 1985 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: January
STATE'OF
COUNTY OF

1985
' •

W. Kenneth Huggler
Concurring

I, W. Kenneth Huggler do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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John Welsek
Dissenting
DATED: January

1985

STATE OF
COUNTY OF

I, John Welsek do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 450, Gas Manufacturing Workers

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case #1839 0370
83D

and
Public Service Electric and Gas Company

The stipulated issues are:
Did the Employer wrongfully refuse to accept
the instant grievance dated May 9, 1983?
Did the Employer violate the collective bargaining agreement by assigning employees of
its Harrison Gas Plant to perform work at the
West End Gas Plant? If so, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on June 22, 1984 at which time representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Undersigned was selected

as Chairman of the Board of Arbitration.

Messers. John Welsek

and W. Kenneth Huggler served respectively as the Union and
Employer designees on said Board.

The Arbitrators' Oath was waived

A stenographic record of the hearing was taken; the Union
gave a verbal summation; the Employer filed a post-hearing brief.
The Board of Arbitration met in executive session on November 19,
1984.
The Employer refused to accept the grievance because the
Union did not cite the contract provisions allegedly breached.
The Employer points to Section 1 of Article XI which defines a

-2a grievance as a dispute or difference "as to the interpretation,
application, or operation of any provision of this Agreement..."
(emphasis added) and argues that that language requires citation
of the contract provisions which the Union claims are violated.
Absent such citations, the grievance fails to meet the contract
definition, is not arbitrable, and need not be accepted in the
grievance procedure.
too technical.

I find the Employer's position on this point

Arbitrators have repeatedly held that the grievance

procedure is not comparable to common-law pleadings.

Every par-

ticular of the dispute need not be cited at the outset, especially
in view of the fact that the steps of the grievance procedure will
require the Union to disclose the contract clauses involved and
the substantive theory of its case.

So in terms of a lack of

information, the Employer is not prejudiced simply by accepting
the grievance for processing.

Also, the grievance here did supply

some identification of the nature of the dispute and thereby
complied substantially with the intent if not the precise letter
of the grievance procedure.
Also, it is well settled that acceptance of a grievance
within the grievance procedure does not mean that the Employer
admits or concedes the arbitrability of that grievance.

Indeed

while reserving its position on the non-arbitrability of a
grievance, an employer may accept, process and discuss a grievance,
without prejudice.

So, under the instant circumstances, I find

and rule that the Employer wrongfully refused to accept the
grievance dated May 9, 1983.
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On the merits, the employees of the Harrison Gas Plant
referred to in the stipulated issue are employees of the Employer,
but in a different bargaining unit than those at the West End Gas
Plant covered by the contract in this case.
The Union's case on behalf of its members at the West End
Gas Plant is that the work performed by those assigned from
Harrison is the work of the West End bargaining unit; that for
employees of another unit to be transferred over to perform that
work side by side with the grievants is prejudicial to the job
security, employment rights, upgrading, and overtime rights of
the unit covered by this contract and violative of Article I
(Recognition and Coverage) thereof.

To permit the Employer to

make the disputed assignments could lead to the erosion and
destruction of the West End bargaining unit and would permit the
Employer to assign bargaining unit work to non-bargaining unit
employees under conditions of employment less favorable than
mandated by the instant contract.
The Employer explains that its action was necessary to
handle temporary or seasonal increases in the demand or use of
produced gas; that to maintain a permanent crew sufficient for
this temporary purpose would be economically unsound and operation^ally unnecessary; that the "remote reporting'1 provisions of the
contract were negotiated with an express understanding that it
would encompass this particular practice of increasing employees
at a gas plant at those infrequent times when needed and that the
additional employees would come from other Employer locations and

-4could be employees of other bargaining units.

The alternative,

asserts the Employer would have been to close the plants involved,
do away with gas production and rely solely on the increased
supply of less expensive natural gas.

That is what other utilities

did. ., But the Employer maintained the West End Plant to handle
what is referred to as "peak sharing," i.e. the production of gas
over a few days in the winter to supplement the supply of natural
gas.

By doing so, the Employer argues, the grievants retained

their employment; but in the absence of a right to transfer other
employees into the operation during the "peak" days, the continued
year-round employment of the basic crew at West End would be
prejudiced.
If this case was confined to Article I of the contract, I
would agree with the Union and sustain the grievance.

Section

2(b) of Article I clearly and explicitly requires that "all employees" (other than those excluded in (a)) shall come under the
terms and conditions of this Agreement..." The employees transfered from Harrison to West End were "employees" and they were at
the West End Gas Plant by virtue of the temporary transfer.

It

is a logical interpretation of Section 2(a) and (b) that the employees, and hence the work performed by employees at the West
End plant belonged in the Union's jurisdiction and should be
assigned only to members of this bargaining unit.

That would

preclude the assignments complained of in this proceeding.
But it is clear that such general jurisdictional provisions
may be varied by mutual agreement and for special circumstances.
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I am persuaded that the 1982 negotiations over expanded remote
reporting payments included express discussions between the
parties and a resultant understanding that the remote reporting
pay arrangements would be used to cover the occasional circumstances present in the instant case, and not just for "training
purposes."
The Employer's

testimony on this point was specific, detail

ed, unequivocal and though denied by Union's witnesses, basically
unrefuted by evidentiary standards.
I conclude therefore that under the special circumstances
involved in ''peak" demand for gas production over a few days in
the winter, the Employer gained the right to transfer into the
gas plants employees from other locations and from different
bargaining units in exchange for and pursuant to improved remote
reporting payments.
Indeed, I do not think that the parties engaged in
negotiations over the remote reporting provisions and pay, simply
for training purposes.

The pay and the remote reporting arrange-

ments must have been intended to cover other activies, and I am
persuaded that the parties mutually discussed and understood that
it would apply to fleshing out the work force at a gas plant like
the West End Plant, during the few days of the "peak" period.
The present use of remote reporting for this purpose does
not constitute an abuse.
potential for abuse.

I agree with the Union that there is

I am sure if I or any other arbitrator saw

that the Employer exercised the right of transfer for the purpose

-6or effect of damaging this or any other bargaining unit, or if
the employment rights of an affected bargaining unit were prejudiced, we would identify it as an abuse of authority and enjoin that particular use.

But the present set of facts do not

rise to that level.
Finally, but significantly, and again as an accepted or
agreed to variation from Article I, the Union concedes that the
Employer could have subcontracted the disputed assignments and
that if it had done so the Union would not have grieved.

To my

mind I see no contractual distinction in the instant circumstances
between subcontracting and the transfer of employees of other
bargaining units from Harrison to West End.

Both involve the

taking over of West End bargaining unit jobs by non-bargaining
unit personnel.

Both contain the potential of depriving the West

End bargaining unit of job security, upgrades, and overtime.

Both

are equally inconsistent with the Union's interpretation of
Article I of the contract.

Indeed, if employees at the West End

Gas Plant "come under the terms and conditions of this Agreement"
that would apply as much to outside contractors as to employees
of the Employer from other bargaining units.

In short, with this

concession, the Union argues fatally against its own case.
For the foregoing reasons, and under the particular circumstances of this case, the Union's grievance Is denied.

DATED: January 9, 1985

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

___._ __________.— ________—_____„______—V

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
Between
LOCAL 144, SEIU

and,

AWARD

SILVER LAKE NURSING HOME
(Registered Nurse Coverage)
__

_

__

__

\r

I, the undersigned, being the Arbitrator designated by the parties
pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement entered into on September 22, 1981 by
and between Silver Lake Nursing Home (the "Employer"), Local 144 Hotel,
Hospital, Nursing Home and Allied Services Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO (the "Union")
and the Greater New York Health Care Facilities Association, Inc. (the
"Association"), to whom was submitted the matter in controversy between them,
and having duly heard their proofs and arguments, AWARD as follows:
1. Effective April 1, 1978, all registered nurses holding the titles
of Director of Nursing Service, Assistant Director of Nursing Service, InService Coordinator and Nursing Supervisor, their relief, replacements and/
or successors, are supervisory and/or managerial employees of the Employer
and, as such, are excluded from the bargaining unit covered by the Registered
Nurses Master Agreement by and between the Association and the Union as
renewed and extended by Agreement dated June 27, 1984.
2. The Employer shall have no obligation to make contributions
to the Union's Benefit Funds for and upon the employees encompassed within

paragraph "1", supra, retroactive to April 1, 1978, and shall be entitled
to a refund or credit for any such contributions made after April 1, 1978,
together with interest thereon.

Dated:

New York, New York
March 15, 1985

Eric xf. Schmertz
ARBITRATOR

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

On this 15th day of March, 1985, before me personally
appeared ERIC J. SCHMERTZ, to me known and known to me to be the
individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument,
and he duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
District 1199E, National Union of
Hospital and Health Care Employees

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Hospital violate Section 1.2(a) or
3.1 of the agreement when it refused to
place the position of Transportation Specialist in the bargaining unit on February 15,
1983? If so, what shall be the remedy, if any?
A hearing was held on May 16, 1985 at which time representatives of the above named Union and Hospital appeared.

All con-

cerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Oath was waived.

The Arbitrator's

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.

The Hospital established the job of Transportation Specialist as a non-bargaining unit job because it concluded that some
of the duties of the job were complex and required levels of
skills and independent iudgment beyond the scope of jobs within
the bargaining unit.

Therefore it assigned the job non-bargain-

ing status and filled it with a non-bargaining

unit incumbent.

In my view, the answer to the stipulated issue is found in
Section 1.2(a) of the contract.

That Section which defines the

bargaining unit reads:
Employee Defined: Whenever used in this Agreement the term "employee" shall mean all fulltime and regular part-time service and maintenance employees who work regularly twenty (20)
or more hours in the week, including food production and service employees, laundry and linen
workers, housekeeping employees, nursing assistants, radiology aides, autopsy assistants, laboratory aides, motor service employees, animal caretakers, grounds and maintenance employees, central
material service employees, receiving and stores
employees, ward clerks, physical and occupational
therapy aides and attendants, nursing technicians

-2other than O.K. Technicians, excluding all
cashiers, communication employees, patient
hostesses, central duplicating service employees, office clerical employees, physicians, dentists, registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, technical and professional employees, temporary employees, guards,
confidential employees, supervisory employees,
administrative employees, executive employees,
maintenance inspectors, O.K. Technicians and
all other employees.
The jobs included in the unit are prima facie more related
to the disputed position than those excluded from the unit.

For

example, the unit classifications include "motor service employees,
nursing assistants, physical and occupational Therapists"

(cover-

ing apparently the job of rehabilitation aide, referred to at the
hearing), and "attendants."

The job of Transportation Specialist

involves driving a van, transporting out-patients to and from the
hospital, with attention to the ailments, disabilities, dress and
physical equipment of those patients at pick-up and during the
period of transportation.

Based on the record before me, those

duties are prima facie similar to employees of motor services, to
the duties and independent responsibility of physical and occupational therapy aides (and rehabilitation

aides), to nursing assist-

ants and technicians.
By contrast, I can find no such relationship or similarities
between the job of Transportation Specialist and the jobs expressly excluded from the unit.

Indeed, a review of the enumer-

ated excluded jobs does not reveal one into which the Transportation Specialist would logically or substantively fit.
the Transportation

Clearly,

Specialist does not qualify as a professional

or licensed employee as do phsyicians, dentists, and nurses.

Nor

does it fit within the enumerated cashier, communication, hostesses,
duplicating or clerical employees.

Also, there is nothing about

the job that qualifies it as professional, confidential, temporary, executive, supervisory, administrative, maintenance, inspec-
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tional or as an operating room technician.

Nor does it fall with-

in the "catch-all" phrase "and all other employees."

Well settled

contract law accords to that phrase the meaning of other jobs
similar to those enumerated.

The Transportation Specialist does

not so qualify.
Based on the foregoing, I find that the Hospital has the
burden of showing that the job ofTransporation

Specialist requires

such special skills, capabilities and independent judgment as to
set it apart from the bargaining unit jobs'which appear to have
related tasks and responsibilities, to justify its exclusion from
the unit.

The Hospital has not met this burden.

The Position Description of the job of Transporation
Specialist reads:
A. SUMMARY:
Under limited supervision, applies knowledge of rehabilitation equipment and patient
care techniques to assist patients in transfering to and from vehicle and to assure their
safety and comfort during transport; drives
vehicle to pick up and deliver patients to and
from the Hospital.
B. TYPICAL DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:
(This enumeration is representative rather
than inclusive.)
1.

Assists patients in getting in and out of
van, using knowledge of proper patient transportation techniques such as side angle entry,
rear entry transfer, etc. based on diagnosis
and condition of patient.

2.

Ensures that patients are attired in or are
in possession of appropriate rehabilitation
equipment such as braces, splints, ADL training equipment, etc. necessary for transport
and/or treatment.

3.

Confers with patient, family members, nurses,
etc. to determine transportability of patient
to rehabilitation center for treatment; may
seek advice of Hospital professional staff
based on condition of patient.

4.

Applies, removes, inspects, and adjusts patient
rehabilitation equipment as needed in connection with transportation process.
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5. Drives Hospital van or other vehicle to
transport patients to and from the Hospital,
Levindale, patient homes, other hospitals,
treatment facilities, et.
6. Observes passengers and responds to patients'
needs during transportation, noting significant changes in condition or complaints from
patients; may apply basic First Aid or life
support techniques as necessary; notifies
physicians, nurses, therapists, etc. of any
problems incurred during transport.
7. Loads and unloads wheelchairs, walkers, or
other equipment into vehicle as necessary.
8. Maintains logs and records of services performed including number and names of patients
transported, points of origin and destination,
mileage, driving time, etc.
9. Maintains the appearance and proper operation
of the vehicle by performing periodic cleaning
of interior and exterior, checking fluid levels,
recording routine maintenance performed; notifying supervisor of mechanical problems or service
needs, etc.
10. May transport supplies, prescriptions, or other
materials as necessary.
11. Reads and follows maps as required to determine most efficient routes to use.
12. Performs related duties as required or assigned.
The Hospital concedes that items B 5,7,8,9 and 10 are
"simple" and could be performed by a bargaining unit employee.
With regard to the remaining duties and responsibilities,
which the Hospital characterizes as "complex," I find no probative
reason why they could not be satisfactorily performed by a properly trained member of the bargaining unit.

Indeed the Position

Description states that a worker would become "proficient" within
"six months."

That period to achieve proficiency is not lengthy,

and casts doubt on the Hospital's assertion that duties and responsibilities B 1,2,3,4,6, and 11 are too "complex" for a bargain
ing unit employee.
Significant however is that the Transporation specialist

-5job, and especially the so-called "complex" duties, involve activities, responsibilities and procedures not so far removed from the
rehabilitation aide, the unit driver, the unit nursing aide or the
unit physical therapy aide to disqualify

the job from bargaining

unit production.
The Position Description defines the required ability as:
"possess[ing] the knowledge, skill, physical
ability and mental capacity to perform the
typical duties and responsibilities enumerated above or implicit therein."
The Hospital's case on the "typical duties and responsibilities," as set forth in the record before me, falls short of
persuading me that they are materially different from those of
some bargaining unit jobs, or that only a non-bargaining
ployee can qualify.
of the contract.

unit em-

As such, the Hospital violated Section 1.2(a)

I need not therefore deal with the allegations

regarding Section 3.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and havin,
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties,
makes the following AWARD:
The Hospital violated Section 1.2(a) of the
Agreement when it refused to place the position of Transportation Specialist in the bargaining unit on February 15, 1983.
The Hospital shall place that job within the
jurisdiction of the bargaining unit and it
shall be filled by a qualified bargaining unit
employee in accordance with the terms and procedures of the Agreement.

DATED: August 22, 1985
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 144 S.E.I.U.
and

A W A R D

Southern New York Residential Health
Care Facilities Association, Inc.
and on behalf of its members
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
jj having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The document entitled Local 144 - Southern
New York Residential Health Care Facilities
Welfare Fund and marked Joint Exhibit #1 in
the record, shall be the Agreement and Declaration of Trust of said Welfare Fund, with
the following determinations on those provisions thereof which were in dispute and which
were the subject of the hearing of April 17,
1985:
A. At the end of Article I, Section 1 (page 2)
there shall be added:
"The term Employer shall also mean for the
purpose of this Agreement, the Fund, and
any affiliated Fund of this Fund, so long
as said Fund or Funds, make contributions
to this Fund on the same basis as any other
Employer, pursuant to acceptance by the
Trustees."
The last sentence of Article I, Section 6
(page 3) shall be deleted. In its place
shall be the provision:
"The Trustees shall determine the amount of
such benefits as required by the collective
bargaining agreement."
B.

Under Article IV, Section 2 (page 6), the
final words thereof:
"subject to the provisions of Article VI
Section 8" shall be deleted.

C.

Under Article V, Section 1 (page 6) there
shall be added to the first sentence after
the word "agreement" the following language:
"and if the Collective Bargaining Agreement
is silent, as the Trustees shall direct."
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Under Article V there shall be a Section
3(a) which shall read:
"In addition to all other remedies, if
the Trustees, shall complain that any
Employer has not made full payment to
the Trustees as required under the provision of any collective bargaining agreement, such complaint may be handled in the
same manner as provided for in the grievance and arbitration provisions contained
in whatever collective bargaining agreement
applies."
Section 3(b) of Article V shall read:
"The Trustees are hereby given the right,
in their capacity as Trustees, to institute
or intervene in any proceeding at law, in
equity, or in bankruptcy, for the purpose
of effectuating the collection of Contributions due to the Fund from any Employer
under the provisions of an applicable collective bargaining agreement or the Act. The
Trustees are hereby empowered to seek all
damages, including but not limited to liquidated damages (as provided in the Act), interest at such rates as the Trustees shall
from time to time determine, and the costs
and legal fees incurred in such proceeding,
to which the Fund is or may be entitled."
D. There shall be in Article IX a Section 10
(page 23) which shall read:
"With regard to every Article and Section of
this Agreement and Declaration of Trust, it
is expressly understood that the rights of
individual fiduciaries under ERISA are not
waived."
E. Section l(e) of Article VI (pages 8/9) shall read
"Receive, purchase or subscribe for any securities or other property of any kind, nature
or description, whatsoever that they deem to
be acceptable, and to retain such securities
or other property in the Trust Fund; and"
Under Article VI, Section 4 the words "or
without" in the second line of the second
sentence, shall be deleted.
Article VI, Section 5 shall read:
"Notices given to or by the Trustees, the
Southern Association, the Union or the Employers shall be deemed duly given and sufficient
if in writing and delivered by messenger with
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a receipt obtained therefor, or sent by
prepaid first class mail return receipt
requested. Except as herein otherwise
provided, distribution or delivery of any
statement or document required hereunder
to be made to the Trustees, Southern Association, Union or Employers shall be sufficient
if delivered by messenger with a receipt obtained therefore or if sent by prepaid first
class mail."
Article VI, Section 6 (page 15) shall read:
"The expenses incurred in the collection of
Contributions and in the administration and
operation of the Trust Fund shall be paid
from the Trust Fund. The Trustees may utilize facilities offered to them by the Union
to collect Employer Contributions."
There shall be a Section 7 as part of Article
VI which shall read as set forth on page 15.
Section 8 as set forth on page 15 shall be
deleted.
Section 8 set forth on page 16 and top of
page 17 shall be deleted in its entirety, but
shall be agreed to and made the subject of a
side document.
Article VI, Section 9 (page 15) shall read:
"Any fiduciary with respect to the Trust or
Plan may receive such benefits as he may be
entitled to as a participant and may receive
reimbursement of expenses properly and actually
incurred in the performance of his duties with
respect to the Trust or the Plan upon presentation of receipts and like evidence for such expenses. Such reasonable expenses shall include
the cost incurred in attendance at and participation in appropriate educational conferences
held for fiduciaries, administrators, and
fund managers. However, no fiduciary shall
receive compensation from the Trust or the Plan
other than for reimbursement of expenses actually
and properly incurred.
F. Article VII, Section 3 (page 18) shall conclude
with the words:
"and the eligibility for benefits of employees."
The final sentence of Article VII, Section 4
shall read:
"The Employer shall pay any delinquent amount
mutually agreed upon in such a conference or
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the amount claimed by the Trustees to be
delinquent if mutual agreement is not
reached, within thirty (30) days from the
date the conference is ended or within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report if no conference is requested, with
interest from the date payment was due at
rates to be set from time to time by the
Trustees, at published prevailing rates."
The present final sentence beginning "In
no event..." shall be deleted.
Article VII, Section 5 (page 19) shall read:
"The expense of the first audit of an Employer's records whenever performed by the representatives of the Trustees, pursuant to
Article VII, Section 3 hereof, shall be paid
by the Fund. If a second or subsequent audit
is performed, pursuant to Article VII, Section
3 hereof, same shall be paid by the Fund unless a delinquency is established in an amount
in excess of $500.00, in which event the Trustees
shall require the Employer to pay for the cost
of the audit.
G. Article X, Section 10 (page 27) shall provide
that the Union President and the Association
President shall alternate as Chairperson and
Secretary of the Trust Fund, annually. The
Union President shall assume the Welfare Trust
Fund Chair initially and the Association President shall assume the Welfare Trust Fund Secretaryship initially. The reverse shall be the
procedure in the Pension Trust Fund.
Under Article X, Section 11 the second sentence
thereof (page 27) shall include provision for
meetings to be held at the offices of the Fund
as well as at other locations listed.
Under Article X, Section 12, the last sentence
thereof (on pages 27 and 28) shall read:
"A judgment confirming the decision may be
entered in any court of competent jurisdiction."
H.

The last sentence of Article XI, Section 2
(pages 28 and 29) shall read:
"Any assets of the Trust remaining after the
satisfaction of all liabilities under the Plan
to Participants and Other Beneficiaries as required by the Act and payment or provision of
the payment of the aforesaid obligation of the
Trust shall be distributed in accordance with
applicable law."

I.

In Article XIV, the references in the first and

-5second lines on page 32 to "Executive Board
of the Union" and "the Board of Directors of
the Association" shall be changed respectively to "The Union" and "The Association."
J. All the foregoing A through I shall apply to
the Pension Fund Agreement and Declaration of
Trust.
With regard to the outstanding disputes arising out of Article II, Section S of the collective bargaining agreement, I make the following
determinations:

j
1. As the parties agreed at the hearing, the
consultants and actuaries for the Local 144 Southern Funds, shall be the firm of ToucheRoss .
2. The carriers of said Funds shall be selected
by the parties from among those carriers who
have filed bids with Touche-Ross and who are
referred to the parties for selection by ToucheRoss .
3. There shall be a single Administrator. The
selection of the administrator and staff shall
be made by the parties following advice and
recommendations on said matters to the parties
from the consultant.

i
4. The office space for the Funds shall be at
an agreed upon neutral location in New York
County of the City of New York. The size of
the office space shall be made upon the recommendations and advice of the consultant and the
administrator. The same shall apply to any other
"administrative details."

j

5. The foregoing rulings, 1 through 4 shall be
implemented and put into effect within thirtyfive calendar days from the date of this Award.
In the event that said implementation and effectiveness is not achieved within said thirty-five
days, I will make forthwith and binding rulings
to bring about said implementation and effectiveness
For the foregoing purposes and for the general
application and interpretation of this entire
Award, I shall retain jurisdiction.

DATED: April 22, 1985
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric/?'. Schmertz
Arbitrator
.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

/

j

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 144 S.E.I.U.
and

A W A R D

Southern New York Residential Health
Care Facilities Association, Inc.
and on behalf of its members
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The document entitled Local 144 - Southern
New York Residential Health Care Facilities
Welfare Fund and marked Joint Exhibit #1 in
the record, shall be the Agreement and Declaration of Trust of said Welfare Fund, with
the following determinations on those provisions thereof which were in dispute and which
were the subject of the hearing of April 17,
1985:
A. At the end of Article I Section 1 (page 2)
there shall be added:
The term Employer shall also mean for the
purpose of this Agreement, the Fund, and
any affiliated Fund of this Fund, so long
as said Fund or Funds, make contributions
to this Fund on the same basis as any other
Employer, pursuant to acceptance by the
Trustees . "
The last sentence of Article I. Section 6
(page 3) shall be deleted. In its place
shall be the provision:
"The Trustees shall determine the amount of
such benefits as required by the collective
bargaining agreement."
B.

Under Article IV, Section 2 (page 6), the
final words thereof:
"subject to the provisions of Article VI
Section 8" shall be deleted.

C.

Under Article V, Section 1 (page 6) there
shall be added to the first sentence after
the word "agreement" the folloxving language
"and if the Collective Bargaining Agreement
is silent, as the Trustees shall direct."
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Under Article V there shall be a Section
3(a) which shall read:
"In addition to all other remedies, if
the Trustees, shall complain that any
Employer has not made full payment to
the Trustees as required under the provision of any collective bargaining agreement, such complaint may be handled in the
same manner as provided for in the grievance and arbitration provisions contained
in whatever collective bargaining agreement
applies. "
Section 3(b) of Article V shall read:
"The Trustees are hereby given the right,
in their capacity as Trustees, to institute
or intervene in any proceeding at law, in
equity, or in bankruptcy, for the purpose
of effectuating the collection of Contributions due to the Fund from any Employer
under the provisions of an applicable collective bargaining agreement or the Act. The
Trustees are hereby empowered to seek all
damages, including but not limited to liquidated damages (as provided in the Act), interest at such rates as the Trustees shall
from time to time determine, and the costs
and legal fees incurred in such proceeding,
to which the Fund is or may be entitled."
D. There shall be in Article IX a Section 10
(page 23) which shall read:
"With regard to every Article and Section of
this Agreement and Declaration of Trust, it
is expressly understood that the rights of
individual fiduciaries under ERISA are not
waived."
E. Section l(e) of Article VI (pages 8/9) shall read
"Receive, purchase or subscribe for any securities or other property of any kind, nature
or description, whatsoever that they deem to
be acceptable, and to retain such securities
or other property in the Trust Fund; and"
Under Article VI, Section 4 the words "or
without" in the second line of the second
sentence, shall be deleted.
Article VI, Section 5 shall read:
"Notices given to or by the Trustees, the
Southern Association, the Union or the Employers shall be deemed duly given and sufficient
if in writing and delivered by messenger with
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a receipt obtained therefor, or sent by
prepaid first class mail return receipt
requested. Except as herein otherwise
provided, distribution or delivery of any
statement or document required hereunder
to be made to the Trustees, Southern Association, Union or Employers shall be sufficient
if delivered by messenger with a receipt obtained therefore or if sent by prepaid first
class mail."
Article VI, Section 6 (page 15) shall read:
"The expenses incurred in the collection of
Contributions and in the administration and
operation of the Trust Fund shall be paid
from the Trust Fund. The Trustees may utilize facilities offered to them by the Union
to collect Employer Contributions."
There shall be a Section 7 as part of Article
VI which shall read as set forth on page 15.
Section 8 as set forth on page 15 shall be
deleted.
Section 8 set forth on page 16 and top of
page 17 shall be deleted in its entirety, but
shall be agreed to and made the subject of a
side document.
Article VI, Section 9 (page 15) shall read:
"Any fiduciary with respect to the Trust or
Plan-may receive such benefits as he may be
entitled to as a participant and may receive
reimbursement of expenses properly and actually
incurred in the performance of his duties with
respect to the Trust or the Plan upon presentation of receipts and like evidence for such expenses. Such reasonable expenses shall include
the cost incurred in attendance at and participation in appropriate educational conferences
held for fiduciaries, administrators, and
fund managers. However, no fiduciary shall
receive compensation from the Trust or the Plan
other than for reimbursement of expenses actually
and properly incurred.
F. Article VII, Section 3 (page 18) shall conclude
with the words:
"and the eligibility for benefits of employees."
The final sentence of Article VII, Section 4
shall read:
"The Employer shall pay any delinquent amount
mutually agreed upon in such a conference or
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the amount claimed by the Trustees to be
delinquent if mutual agreement is not
reached, within thirty (30) days from the
date the conference is ended or within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report if no conference is requested, with
interest from the date payment was due at
rates to be set from time to time by the
Trustees, at published prevailing rates."
The present final sentence beginning "In
no event..." shall be deleted.
Article VII, Section 5 (page 19) shall read:
"The expense of the first audit of an Employer 's records whenever performed by the representatives of the Trustees, pursuant to
Article VII, Section 3 hereof, shall be paid
by the Fund. If a second or subsequent audit
is performed, pursuant to Article VII, Section
3 hereof, same shall be paid by the Fund unless a delinquency is established in an amount
in excess of $500.00, in which event the Trustees
shall require the Employer to pay for the cost
of the audit.
G. Article X, Section 10 (page 27) shall provide
that the Union President and the Association
President shall alternate as Chairperson and
Secretary of the Trust Fund, annually. The
Union President shall assume the Welfare Trust
Fund Chair initially and the Association President shall assume the Welfare Trust Fund Secretaryship initially. The reverse shall be the
procedure in the Pension Trust Fund.
Under Article X, Section 11 the second sentence
thereof (page 27) shall include provision for
meetings to be held at the offices of the Fund
as well as at other locations listed.
Under Article X, Section 12, the last sentence
thereof (on pages 27 and 28) shall read:
"A judgment confirming the decision may be
entered in any court of competent jurisdiction."
H.

The last sentence of Article XI, Section 2
(pages 28 and 29) shall read:
"Any assets of the Trust remaining after the
satisfaction of all liabilities under the Plan
to Participants and Other Beneficiaries as required by the Act and payment or provision of
the payment of the aforesaid obligation of the
Trust shall be distributed in accordance with
applicable law."

I.

In Article XIV, the references in the first and

-5second lines on page 32 to "Executive Board
of the Union" and "the Board of Directors of
the Association" shall be changed respectively to "The Union" and "The Association."
J. All the foregoing A through I shall apply to
the Pension Fund Agreement and Declaration of
Trust.
With regard to the outstanding disputes arising out of Article II, Section S of the collective bargaining agreement, I make the following
determinations:
1. As the parties agreed at the hearing, the
consultants and actuaries for the Local 144 Southern Funds, shall be the firm of ToucheRoss .
2. The carriers of said Funds shall be selected
by the parties from among those carriers who
have filed bids with Touche-Ross and who are
referred to the parties for selection by ToucheRoss.
3. There shall be a single Administrator. The
selection of the administrator and staff shall
be made by the parties following advice and
recommendations on said matters to the parties
from the consultant.
4. The office space for the Funds shall be at
an agreed upon neutral location in New York
County of the City of New York. The size of
the office space shall be made upon the recommendations and advice of the consultant and the
administrator. The same shall apply to any other
"administrative details."
5. The foregoing rulings, 1 through 4 shall be
implemented and put into effect within thirtyfive calendar days from the date of this Axvard.
In the event that said implementation and effectiveness is not achieved within said thirty-five
days, I will make forthwith and binding rulings
to bring about said implementation and effectiveness
For the foregoing purposes and for the general
application and interpretation of this entire
Award, I shall retain jurisdiction.

DATED: April 22, 1985
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) °

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon ray Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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Local 144 - Southern Funds
Group Insurance Plan
Schedule of Benefits
For Eligible Employees
o Group Life and Accidental Death and Dismemberment
Employees with

Benefit Amount

-1 year service
1-4 years service
4-5 years service
5-6 years service
6-7 years service
7-8 years service
8-9 years service
9-10 year service
10 years or more

$ 2,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,500
9,500
10,000
An amount equal
earnings to the
of $100, if not
Minimum benefit

to 100% of annual
next higher multiple
already a multiple.
$10,000, Maximum

benefit $25,000.

o Accident and Sickness
Coverage is provided for off-the-job accidents or sickness, including
maternity.
Maximum benefit period = 26 weeks
Weekly benefit = 50% of average weekly wages during last eight
weeks of covered employment.
Maximum benefit = $145 per week
Minimum benefit = $20 per week
Waiting period before benefits commence = 8 days from
beginning of disability
For Eligible Employees and Dependents
o Health Coverage - Option I
Hospitalization
New York Blue Cross

o
o
o
(See detailed description

120 days in full
180 days at 50% of Hospital Charges
30 days for in hosp. mental & nervous
of benefits in appendix)

Medico^ -Surgical and Anesthesia Benefits
GHI insured contract - Type "C" Family Doctor Plan
. <+ff
k
o Doctor Home Visits paid at $8 ? ^ . ^^r^^.j
o Doctor Office Visits paid
paid at 5? I* ^ <** /VfS*
o Maternity Care
Normal Delivery $150
Caesarean Section $250
(Copy of scheduled benefits in appendix) .
Health Coverage - Option II
Hospitalization, Medical -Surgical and Anesthesia Benefits
^
y:
'
•/
'

HIP/HMO
Hospitalization

o unlimited days in member hospitals
o inhospital for mental & nervous covered
for 30 days.
Surgical -Medical and Anesthesia
o covered in full when arranged by HIP/HMO
medical group.
Private Duty Nursing - in full when ordered by a HIP/HMO doctor.
(Copy of HIP/HMO contract in appendix) .
Optical Benefits
o Eye examinations
- Frequency - One exam per individual per calendar year.
- Schedule of Benefits
(1) Optometrist/Optician $10
(2) Opthalmologist
20
o Eyeglass Lenses & Framses
- Frequency - One pair per individual every two years.
- Schedule of Benefits
Eyeglasses and Frames $25
Prescription Drug Benefits
Option I - HIP/HMO covers the full cost of prescription drugs and
appliances when obtained through designated participating pharmacies
and designated appliance dealers under contract with HIP/IWD. In
addition, prescriptions may be filled by mailing them to the HIP/HMO
Drug plan.
Option II - Employees choosing Option II Health coverage will have
their prescription drugs covered under a self -insured plan as follows
Full charge providing prescription is paid by a participating
pharmacy. If not, reimbursement is made in accordance with a
specific schedule of allowances.
o
o

Prescriptions not to exceed a 34 day supply.
Maximum 5 refills within a six month period if doctor
specifies.

******

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Engineer's Union, Local 444,

:

I.U.E.
:

and

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0742 84
Grievance
83-69

Sperry Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer improperly refuse to implement
the relief sought in grievance 83~24? If so,
what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held on December 13, 1984 and March 7, 1985 at
which time representatives of the above named Union and Employer
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed

post-hearing

briefs.
It is the Union's contention that it "won" grievance 83-24 of
Article 26 Section A6 of the contract.

Specifically it asserts

that the Employer failed to respond to the Union's grievance within the time limit set forth in Section A5, and that consequently,
as Section A6 mandates, "The grievance shall...be deemed... affirmatively accepted..."
I conclude that the instant grievance 83~69, which protests the
Employer's refusal to accept and implement the Union's grievance
83~24 and the relief sought therein, qualifies as a dispute "between an employee and the Employer" within the meaning of Article
26

Section A of the contract, and hence covered by the grievance

steps of that Section.
However, I am not persuaded that the procedural default provisions of Sections 5 and 6 obtain in the instant
In my view, the "default" provisions

situation.

should become effective
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only where the default or failure to answer within the prescribed
time is clear and unquestionable.

As the Union is claiming "de-

fault," the burden is on the Union to show the factual clarity
and unequivocal nature of the default and that, as in a challenge
to arbitrability, the grievance is no longer subject to the grievance procedure and arbitration on the merits.
I conclude that that is especially so where, as here, the substantive consequences could involve a major and highly controverte
adjustment of the pension credit system, involving significant
costs, significant numbers of employees, and significant administrative changes; and where those consequences would come about
without subjecting the substance of the grievance to a test on the
merits.
Also, I belief the default must be unconditionally

shown where

as here, other contract time limits in grievance processing have
not always been rigidly observed, as a matter of general practice.
I find that the Employer had the right to ask for the names
of all the affected employees during the processing of grievance
83~24; that the Union agreed to provide those names; that the
Employer had reasonable grounds to believe that its answer was not
required until that information had been provided; and that the
Union's claim it "won" the grievance was made and is based on and
at a point in time before those names were made available.
In short, I am not satisfied that Step Two of the grievance
procedure was completed before the "default" was claimed, and that
therefore the claim of a "default" or that the grievance "was won"
was premature.
With the foregoing holding I need not deal with any of the
other Employer defenses or assertions.
Accordingly, the Union's procedural claim in this proceeding
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is denied.

However, the substantive matter of grievance 83-24

shall be returned to Step Two of the grievance procedure and the
Union shall have the right

to process the dispute of that grie-

vance further within the grievance procedure and to arbitration on
the merits.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties,
makes the following AWARD:
Under the provisions and conditions set forth in
the above Opinion, the Employer did not improperly fail and refuse to implement the relief sought
in grievance 83-24.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 31st, 1985
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration :
between
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.
and

AWARD
•

Technicolor, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Permanent Arbitrator
under the collective bargaining agreement between the above named
parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties, makes the following AWARD:
1.

The Company's claim for damages arising
out of an alleged Union interference with
the Company's efforts to operate the new
Black and White Positive-Negative Processing Machine with a crew complement of two
operators, is denied.
Interference has not been proved. The Company did not order the operators to work
the machine as the Company wanted. The Union
was not put to the test. The Company decided
not to require operation of the machine with
two operators, acceding instead to the Union's
objection to the complement, subject to this
arbitration. The Company had the right to
require operation of the machine as it wanted,
subject to the Union's and employee's rights
to grieve. But because the Company did not
press this right to the point of determining
if the employees would work as ordered and
then grieve, I cannot find "interference" or
actionable Union and/or employee defiance.

2.

Under Section 17(c) of the contract, and
based on comparability with other reasonably related machines, I am persuaded that
the third operator is needed primarily for
relief when the machine is run continuously,
but is not needed when the machine operation
is non-continuous. Therefore the complement
for the new B&W Developing Machine may be two
when operated non-continuously, and shall be
three when operated continuously.

Eric y. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
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DATED: June 19, 1985
STATE OF New York ) ss .
COUNTY OF New York )

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
OPINION

AND

AWARD

and

Technicolor, Inc.

The issue in dispute involves the employment of Alan M. Kitz.
A hearing was held on October 23, 1985 at which time Mr. Kitz,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above named Union and Employer appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
waived.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

The parties filed post-hearing briefs or statements.

Based on the "Interview for Employment" form, Union Exhibit
#1, and the "remarks" thereon, "Temporary - starts/9-20-85 days",
written by the Employer's Vice-President, together with the regular
practices of the industry regarding said "employment" forms, I am
satisfied that the grievant was hired by the Employer, and that a
mutual agreement of employment was entered into.
That the Employer did not know that the grievant was a member
of the Union's bargaining team

and that those duties might inter-

fere with at least thirty days of uninterrupted work for the Employer, at a time when such work schedule as a Timer was very
important to the Employer, is as much the fault of the Employer
as that of the grievant.

In my view, the Employer had as much an

opportunity and duty to ask the grievant when he was interviewed
about any role he might have had with the Union's bargaining team,
as the grievant had the duty to disclose any such position.

As I

see it, the fact is that the Employer thought of or learned of
this possible conflict of time between the productivity needed in
the Timer's job and the grievant's role as a Union negotiator after
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the grievant was hired.

Therefore the Company's insistence that

the grievant and/or the Union give assurances that the grievant
would give at least 30 days of uninterrupted work as a Timer or
make up any

interrupted periods by overtime, cannot be construed

as conditions precedent to the grievant's employment.

Therefore,

no matter how reasonable or realistic the Employer's request were
in those connections, the hiring of the grievant was not dependent
upon his or the Union's response.

Therefore though he and the

Union did not give the Employer the assurance it sought, the Employer had no right to claim that it would not hire the grievant
or commence his employment on September 20th.

The employment

"contract" had previously been made.
Moreover, though I understand and appreciate why the Employer
wanted assurances of at least 30 days work, or an overtime agreement to make up work interrupted by contract negotiations, I am
not persuaded that the Employer had any real and present basis for
requiring any such assurances at the time the grievant was to star-:
work.

At the time, no contract negotiation sessions were sched-

uled.

Neither the grievant nor the Union

meetings would take place.
speculative at the time.

knew when any such

Indeed, the Employer's concern was

Other circumstances were possible.

First,

subsequently scheduled meetings might have been few, if at all,
during the critical 30 day period.

Second, any subsequent sched-

ule when arranged, could and should have been the point and basis
for an arrangement between the parties to achieve an acceptable
balance between the grievant's duties as a Timer and his role with
the Union bargaining team.

And thirdly, when and if any subse-

quently scheduled meetings unreasonably interfered with the
grievant's duties as a Timer, and if the parties were unable then
to work out an acceptable accommodation, the contract would provid
the answer.

Apparently, such a circumstance was contemplated when

-3-

the parties negotiated Section 28 of the collective bargaining
agreement.
I recognize how the application of Section 28 might disrupt
the Employer's plans in this case in connection with what it
needed and expected from the Timer.

But, once unconditionally

hired as the grievant was, the Employer is thereafter bound to
the terms of the contract regarding "absence from service of the
Employer because of "any Union office or position."

The Employer

cannot, after the fact, circumvent the contract provision on that
point by refusing to put to work a person it hired

after it

learns that that person may exercise his Section 28 contract rights
Under the facts of this case, and holding as I have that the
Employer

had as much responsibility to ask or learn about the

grievant's role as a Union negotiator as he had to volunteer that
information, I must conclude that the grievant was denied implementation of the agreement to hire him

because of his position

as a member of the Union's negotiating team, and that such denial
constituted a "deprivation of employment ...because of Union
membership" in violation of Section 2 of the contract.

That the

denial was not based on anti-union animus is no less a contract
violation.
AWARD
For the foregoing reasons, the grievant
should have been put to work as a Timer,
beginning September 20, 1985, and was entitled to the temporary period of employment for which he was hired. The Employer
shall make him whole for his lost wages
during the period involved.
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orDATED:
November
18, n ^1985
STATE OF New York )Dcc
.
O• •
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union

AWARD

and
Thomson Mfg. Company

The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named Union and Company,
and having duly heard the proofs and arguments of said parties
at a hearing on October 8, 1985, makes the following AWARD:
The Company's close down of the plant in
Bennington, Vermont did not violate the
contract.
The benefits to which the affected employees
are entitled are the same as set forth in my
Award of April 17, 1985, International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union -and- Jonathan Logan,
Incorporated (Modern Juniors).
The Company is directed to accord said benefits
to said affected employees.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: November 11, 1985
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

TWA PILOT SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Air Line Pilots Association

AWARD
Case #NY-54-83

and
Trans World Airlines

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of
Arbitration in the above matter, and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above named Association and
Employer, make the following AWARD:
1. The claim of Roger Moore for a paid
move to St. Louis is part of his grievance and is an arbitrable claim in
this case.
2. Roger Moore is not entitled to a paid
move to Chicago or to St. Louis under
Section 13 and other related Sections
of the Agreement.

DATED: January 31, 1985
STATE OF New York)sg .
COUNTY OF New York)

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

Captain William Hoar
Concurring in #2 above
Dissenting from #1 above
DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
I, William Hoar do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD0
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Captain Wallace J. Moran
Concurring in #2 above.
Dissenting from #1 above,
DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

I, Wallace J. Moran do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

Captain D. H. Brown
Concurring in #1 above.
Dissenting from #2 above„
DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

I, D. H. Brown do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD„

Captain Paul Sedlak
Concurring in #1 above.
Dissenting from #2 above
DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
I, Paul Sedlak do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

TWA
TO: Capts. Brown
ADDRESS:
Moran
CITY:
Sedlak

FROM: J. W. Hoar
ADDRESS: 605 Third Avenue
CITY: New Y o r k , New York
DATE: March 20, 1985

COPIES:

See
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IN U . S . A .

TWA PILOT SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration :
between
:
Air Line Pilots Association

:

OPINION OF
CHAIRMAN

and

.

CASE #NY-54-83

Trans World Airlines

:

In accordance with Sections 21 and 22 of the collective
bargaining agreement between the Air Line Pilots Association,
hereinafter referred to as the "Association" and Trans World
Airlines Inc., hereinafter referred to as "TWA" or "the Company"
the Undersigned was selected as the Chairman of a Board of
Adjustment to hear and decide the following issues:
1.

Whether the claim of Roger Moore for a
paid move to St. Louis is part of his
grievance and is an arbitrable claim in
this case.

2.

Whether Moore is entitled to a paid move
to Chicago or St. Louis under Section 13
and other related sections of the agreement.

Hearings were held on May 31, September 4 and October 1, 1984
at which time Mr. Moore, hereinafter

referred to as "Moore" and

representatives of the Association and TWA appeared.

All concerned

were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Captains William

Hoar and Wallace J. Moran served as the TWA designees on the Board
and Captains D.H. Brown and Paul Sedlak served as the Association
designees on the Board.

The Oath of the Arbitrators was waived.

The parties filed post-hearing briefs, and the Board met in executive session thereafter.

The Award in this matter was rendered

-2earlier and signed by the Chairman on January 31, 1985.
the Chairman's

This is

Opinion.
FACTS

Although there was some dispute concerning the details of
certain conversations and other oral communications, the basic
facts material to the determination of this appeal are not in
dispute and they are relatively simple.

Both parties agree that

the meaning and application of Section 13(A) of the agreement
must be resolved for the determination of the substantive issues
Section 13(A) in relevant part, provides:
Pilots, when transferred from one domicile within the United States, to another domicile within
the United States, at Company request, will be allowed actual moving expenses for household effects
up to a maximum of 3000 pounds gross weight for an
employee without dependents and up to a maximum of
8000 pounds gross weight for an employee with one
dependent, plus an additional 600 pounds gross weight
for each additional dependent. Moving of such household goods shall be handled in accordance with the
procedure set forth in the Company's Management
Policy and Procedure Manual. When such procedure
is approved by the Company, expenses for the moving
of two (2) cars shall be allowed each pilot at the
rate of twelve cents (12o) per mile for the first
car and eight cents (8c) per mile for the second car
based on the most direct mileage between the domiciles
from which he is being transferred as set forth in
the table below, plus en route expenses per Section
7(A)(1) for each hour en route based upon 400 miles
travel per day. Also $250 relocation expenses will
be allowed the pilot. If the pilot's wife and dependents also move to the new domicile they will be
allowed relocation expenses of $150.00 for the wife
and $50.00 for each dependent. Dependents are as
presently defined in the Company's Management Policy
and Procedure Manual. If the pilot is a successful
bidder for another domicile, effective within fifteen
(15) days of the effective date of his assignment
to the domicile to which he was transferred at Company request, the above relocation allowances shall
be reduced by one-fifteenth (l/15th) for each day
under fifteen (15).

- 3 On or about October 1, 1982, Moore was involuntarily
transferred from TWA's San Francisco domicile to its Chicago
domicile.

Fearing that the Chicago domicile would be soon closed

and wishing and anticipating that he ultimately would be transferred
to the St. Louis domicile and for other reasons such as avoiding
two moves (to Chicago from California and to St. Louis from Chicago),
Moore decided to move his family to and establish residence in
St. Louis.

There is no dispute between the

parties that a

voluntary transfer of domicile (whether to Chicago or St. Louis)
would not have obligated TWA to pay moving expenses under Section
13(A).

Both parties agree that Moore's transfer to Chicago in

this case, "at the Company's request", was the kind of transfer
(involuntary) which is covered by Section 13(A).

The dispute between

the parties is whether the move made by Moore otherwise satisfied
the requirements of that Section.
In order to bring himself within the scope of Section 13(A),
Moore made several proposals during various discussions with TWA
management.

His main proposal was that he ship his household goods

to his brother-in-law's residence in the Chicago area at TWA's
expense, off-load in Chicago and place the goods on another van
for shipment to St. Louis at his own expense.

He also proposed as

a better alternative that TWA pay for shipment direct to St. Louis
because he claimed it would be less costly than the other proposal.
During the course of these discussions Moore addressed a written
inquiry to TWA asking what TWA would pay.

TWA advised him in

writing that it would pay his actual expenses as provided for in
the contract if he moved to the Chicago area, although a move
within 100 miles of the domicile area would be acceptable.

These

discussions took place and correspondence was sent and received

- 4over a period of time from March through April, 1983.
Having exhausted discussions with some management representatives who maintained the Company would pay for a bona fide or good
faith move to Chicago, but not to St. Louis, and having been told
that the kind of off-loading plan he had in mind should not be
undertaken without Company approval, Moore, on or about April 15.,
1983, filed Company supplied forms applying for moving expenses to
Chicago and listed his brother-in-law's address as the destination.
Moore's admitted intention was to off-load at his brother-in-law's
house and ship to St. Louis at his own expense.

Mike Lannoy, a

management official in the Los Angeles domicile told him, that
Company approval was required for this plan.

Moore claims that

during his pre-application discussions that one, Gerald Moran, a
TWA management employee, advised him that there was no rule as to
how many days the goods had to remain off-loaded to qualify for
payment by TWA and indicated that just off-loading could or would
be sufficient.

Moran denies that he gave Moore such advice and

maintains that the essence of his statement was that Moore had to
make a good faith move to Chicago and it was not possible to state
with precision what would be a good faith move. Resolution of this
factual dispute is not crucial because (1) Moore did not act in
reliance on Moran's version of the statement and (2) Moore was
subsequently advised by authoritative TWA officials that what Moran
allegedly advised was not the policy of TWA; and (3) TWA never
approved the plan.
In any event, Moore did file his application for payment of
moving expenses to Chicago which was routinely approved by TWA.
Apparently., sometime after he filed his application, but before he
actually moved his goods, Moore's intention to off-load in Chicago

- 5 and ship to St. Louis to his actual residence came to the attention
of Captain Pratt, who had the final say on approval of moving
expenses.

Pratt and Moore met.

In substance, Pratt warned Moore

of the danger of discharge for fraud if he pursued his plan x\?hich
was not a good faith move to Chicago.
with termination.

Moore claims he was threatened

He thereafter withdrew his application for pay-

ment of expenses for a move to Chicago and commenced the grievance
process .
During the conversation with Pratt, there was reference to
what appeared to be a practically contemporaneous case in which
TWA paid moving expenses under similar circumstances to a Captain
William O'Neill.

Although O'Neill was not mentioned by name during

their conversation, both Pratt and Moore were aware that at about
the same time Moore's application for moving expenses to Chicago
was being questioned, O'Neill's moving expenses to Chicago had beer
approved in a situation where O'Neill, like Moore, xvas involuntarily
transferred to Chicago from Los Angeles.
expenses were paid by TWA.

Sometime later, O'Neill's

It appears that Moore sought to bring

himself into a fact situation similar or identical to O'Neill's.
The facts and significance

of the O'Neill situation is considered

later in this opinion.
Moore withdrew his application for expenses to Chicago on
May 6 and simultaneously initiated the Section 21 contract grievance.
On May 23, 1983, Moore made a written request for moving expenses
to St. Louis.

A step 1 grievance hearing was held on May 31, 1983.

TWA denied the grievance in a letter dated June 2, 1983, and
specifically denied the St. Louis request in a letter dated June 2,
1983.

The matter was submitted by a letter to this Board, dated

June 23, 1983.
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Issue No. 1 JURISDICTION
The Association asserts and TWA denies that the Board has
jurisdiction to consider the denial of Moore's request for
expenses to St. Louis.

The applicable contract provision Section

22(1), in relevant part states:
No matter shall be considered by the Board
which has not first been handled in accordance
with the provisions of Section 21 of this
Agreement; provided that by agreement of the
parties, matters may be submitted directly to
the Board.
The St. Louis issue was not handled in full compliance with
the procedures established by Section 21 of the agreement.

Thus,

if the Board has jurisdiction over the St. Louis matter it would
be by virtue of conduct amounting to a waiver of the Section 21
requirements or an agreement under Section 22.

A verbatim record

of the May 31 Step 1 hearing as well as all of the relevant corres
pondence was received in evidence by the Board.
I agree with the Association that during the Step 1 hearing
the St.Louis issue was considered and, viewed in the context of
the correspondence and discussions, both parties understood and
at the least TWA led the Association reasonably to believe that thfe
St. Louis request would be denied and that there was agreement that
it would be determined in the
issue.

same arbitration with the Chicago

Hence, whether by virtue of TWA's waiver or agreement, I

conclude the Board has jurisdiction over the St. Louis matter.
Additionally, because in the alternative, the Union claims that
St. Louis is in the Chicago domicile, a grievance over the latter
covers the former.
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Issue No. 2.

The Substantive Questions

Both parties agree that the transfer to the Chicago domicile
was "at the Company's request" and hence Section 13(A) applied to
Moore's transfer. The issue which separates the parties is whether
Moore was required to do more than and something other than he
proposed to do, i.e. off-load in Chicago and ship to St. Louis at
his own expense to qualify for

payment of the expenses to Chicago,

or ship directly to St. Louis for payment of expenses to Chicago or
St. Louis.
The Company argues that the language of 13(A), the intent of
parties as it is reflected in other conduct (particularly collective
bargaining negotiation postures) and a common-sense resolution of
any ambiguities in the contract language require the conclusion
that the Company's obligation is limited to

payment of actual

expenses of and only when there is a bona fide move by the involuntary transferee into the Chicago area, the new domicile.

The

Association, on the other hand, argues that the contract language
contains no requirement of a move into the Chicago area; that TWA
conduct on at least two occasions as well as certain alleged
admissions by TWA management support the Association's view of the
matter; and the Association's resolution of the ambiguity makes
more sense.
THE CONTRACT LANGUAGE
The Association argues:
(1)

Section 13(A) by its terms does not require that the

pilot move to the new domicile (the Chicago area) to be entitled
to "actual moving expenses for household goods"; and
(2)

If Section 13(A) does require the pilot to move to the

new domicile, Moore would satisfy this requirement by off-loading
in Chicago or by moving directly to St. Louis.
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The contract language does not explicitly state the pilot
must move to the new domicile, but the language that is used and
the context in which it is used leads to the conclusion that such
a move by the pilot is contemplated.

The language speaks of

"actual moving" expenses and the term "moving" itself suggests
more than a mere shipment of goods.

The entire context of the

Section suggests that the pilot and perhaps his family are moving
to a new domicile. The dependent's relocation expenses are payable by TWA only if they "also move to the new domicile". This
clause suggests that someone else has "moved" to the new domicile
and this could only refer to the pilot and his entitlement to
moving and relocation expenses.

The phrasing of Section 13(A)

surely could be better, but the most reasonable construction is
that it contemplates a "move" and not a mere shipment of goods
and a move refers to a person Vs.'

(here, the pilot) conduct and

purpose. The Association's argument suggests that mere shipment
of goods for whatever purpose and with no one "moving" provided
it is "household" goods that is shipped would satisfy Section
13(A).

This construction must be and is rejected. Rather I

conclude that there must be a "move" by the pilot and not a mere
shipment of goods to the new domicile to qualify for TWA paid
expenses under Section 13(A).
This brings us to the question of whether Moore's proposed
conduct constituted a move to the Chicago area for the purposes
of Section 13(A).

Stripped to its essence the Association's

claim that off-loading in Chicago with shipment at Moore's expense
to the new family residence in St. Louis rests on the following:
(1)

The off-load for any

period of time at a place in the

Chicago area which Moore designated at the destination (here, his
brother-in-law's house) must be taken at face value as the place

- 9to which he was moving and subsequent shipment of the goods and
Moore's intent at the time are irrelevant;
(2)

If the subsequent shipment to St. Louis is relevant, then

St. Louis is within the Chicago area for the purposes of the contract and it qualifies either the off-load plan or the direct shipment to St. Louis for Company payment;
(3)

TWA's conduct on two other occasions as well as advice

to Moore were in accord with the Association's construction of the
contract and as such, constitute authori.tative construction of the
language; and
(4)

By virtue of its conduct on those two occasions, TWA is

estopped from denying Moore paid expenses, whereas a contrary view
would discriminate against Moore in violation of the agreement.
To hold that the clear intent to ship to St. Louis is
irrelevent, as the Association urges, would make the requirement
that the pilot actually move to the new domicile a meaningless
requirement.

It would permit utilization of Section 13(A) as a

device for requiring the Company to pay expenses not actual moving
expenses.

If, as 1 have already determined, Section 13(A) requires

the pilot to move to the new domicile area in order to qualify for
expenses under 13(A), then where he intends to move as part of the
moving process is clearly relevant.

It is true that borderline or

difficult cases can be envisaged where this determination might
present difficult questions, but in this case, where the Association
agrees and the evidence is undisputed and comes from Moore himself
that he unequivocally intended to ship his goods from his brotherin-law's house in the Chicago area to his new home in the St. Louis
area, no difficulty is presented. Hence, unless TWA by its conduct
has construed the provision differently and thereby bound itself in
this case or unless St. Louis is in the Chicago area for the purposes
of Section 13(A), Moore's move was not to the Chicago area and his

- 10 plan to off-load in Chicago and ship to St. Louis or to ship
to St. Louis would not comply with Section 13(A) for purposes
of moving expenses.
In this connection, the disputed versions of Moran's statements to Moore in which Moore claims he was told all he had
to do was off-load in Chicago would not be dispositive of the
.
issue . If Moran did make such a statement to Moore, it was
not a binding construction of the contract in view of the fact
that Moore did not act or rely on the statement to his detriment
and because of the clear contrary statements he later received
from Moran, Captain Pratt and others before

he moved.

TWA's

view of its contract obligations communicated to Moore before
he moved were wholly consistent with their position throughout
their dealings with Moore and in this proceeding.
There remains the question of whether TWA is estopped from
denying Moore's request.

The Association relies on two instances

to support its position.

The first involves the 1971 example

of a Captain Van Etten, who was involuntarily transferred to
Los Angeles from Boston, moved to Las Vegas and was paid his
moving expenses to Las Vegas.

One instance does not reflect

a policy or a prejudicial practice, and hence is insufficient
as a basis for estoppel.

The reason Captain Van Etten's expenses

were paid are unclear in the record.

As I see it, at best the

Van Etten situation might be argued as authority for payment
under an "equivalent move" concept i.e. that a move to St. Louis
is less costly than shipment to Chicago, but it is not authority
for the "off-loading" plan of this case.
But in relying on the Van Etten situation in its request for
a paid move to St. Louis, the Association,

disclaims reliance on

the concept of "equivalent move", asserting instead that St. Louis
is within the Chicago domicile.

- 11 Hence, the facts of the instant case, the theories relied on
by the Association, and the Association's disclaimers, remove the
"equivalent move" concept from this case.

Though there is no

probative evidence in the record supporting the .view that an
"equivalent move" concept is part of the proper application of
Section 13(A). a determination of that question need not therefore
be made.

Accordingly, the Van Etten matter is not precedent for

the application of Section 13(A).
As for the case of Captain O'Neill, it does appear that he,
like Moore, was transferred to Chicago.
a move to St. Louis.

He, like Moore, anticipated

He, as Moore intended to do, off-loaded in

Chicago prior to shipment of the goods to his nex\ home in St. Louis.
TWA actually paid the expenses to Chicago for O'Neill, but conducted
an examination of the circumstances of the
aware of the shipment to St. Louis.

payment when it became

Payment was made to the

moving company because the move was already made and it had relied
on TWA's commitment to pay.

At the time Moore was making his

inquiries and patterning his move after O'Neill's, TWA's examination of the O'Neill situation was underway.

Ultimately, TWA

determined that O'Neill may have relied in good faith on what he
believed he had been told by TWA and that the move was made before
an impropriety was made clear to O'Neill.

Consequently, TWA

determined to pay the moving company and not to seek repayment
from O'Neill.

The O'Neill case does not represent an instance of

payment pursuant to TWA policy.

Indeed, the contrary is the case.

Approval was given; payment was made before TWA was aware of all
the facts of O'Neill's move.

The question for TWA was what action

should it take where payment was made contrary to TWA's policy and
its view of the contract, where there may have been good faith
reliance by O'Neill and the moving company.

This cannot be binding

or persuasive precedent in the instant case where unlike O'Neill

- 12 he was instructed not to carry out his plan, Moore did not proceed,
there was no payment, and no reliance.
As :or the claim that TWA discriminated against Moore in its
treatment of him, the foregoing material differences between
O'NeilVsand Moore's cases preclude a finding of discriminatory
treatment.
There remains the question of whether St. Louis is in the
Chicago area.

St. Louis, 289 miles away from Chicago, on its face

would not be viewed as being in the "Chicago area".

There was no

evidence that Moore's obiect in moving to St. Louis bore any relationship to its proximity to the Chicago area. Indeed, his entire
course of conduct recognized that St. Louis was not in the Chicago
area.

Additionally, TWA has identified St. Louis and Chicago as

separate, independent domiciles. Such determination is a managerial
prerogative.
The evidence indicates that Moore did not intend to reside
in St. Louis because of its connection with the Chicago area;
rather, his purpose was to avoid an additional move from the
Chicago area to St. Louis because he expected and wanted a transfer
to St. Louis.

The basis for his arguments to TWA when seeking

approval never suggested that living in St. Louis in any way was
in aid of his being assigned to the Chicago domicile.

Indeed, his

proposal that he off-load in Chicago and ship to St. Louis at his
own expense was an implicit admission that St. Louis was not in
the Chicago area for the purposes of Section 13(A). Irrespective
of any Company policy or guideline that TWA would accept moves
within 100 miles of the Chicago area for the purposes of Section
13(A), it is clear that St. Louis does not meet that criteria and
that no purpose is served by including St. Louis in a requirement
that a pilot move to the Chicago area.

I conclude, therefore,
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that St. Louis is not within the Chicago area for the purposes
of Section 13(A).

Consequently, neither TWA's denial of expenses

for the move to Chicago nor its denial of expenses for the move
to St. Louis violated Section 13(A).

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: February 28, 1985

''In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Chemical Workers Union
•V
AFL-CIO, Local 183
AWARD

AND

OPINION

and
Union Carbide Corp., Linde Division

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the contract by eliminating the Shipper job classification and
assigning some of the Shipper duties to the
DCC? If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on August 9, 1985 at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared and were
afforded full opportunity of offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Undersigned was selected as the Chairman of the Board of
Arbitration.

Messrs. William Maier and Edward S. Danielski served

respectively as the Union and Company designees on the Board of
Arbitration.
The Oath of the Arbitrators was waived.
post-hearing brief.

The Company filed a

The Union gave its summation verbally.

In accordance with Article IV Step 4 of the contract and the
agreement of the parties and the Board members at the hearing, no
panel session of the Board was held, and the decision of the
Chairman, with appropriate concurrance by at least one Board
designee, constitutes the Award in this case.
The issue is narrow.

The Union does not protest the estab-

lishment of the non-bargaining unit DCC job, nor does it protest
the bulk of the combinations of duties in the job which were
previously part of other jobs classifications.

Nor does it pro-

test the overall arrangement to combine some fourteen jobs into
seven of which the DCC job was among the latter, as part of the
Company's plan to gain greater job assignment and productivity
flexibility.
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What the Union does complain about is the assignment of
certain duties to the DCC job which were previously performed
by the bargaining unit shippers, and the consequential elimination
of the Shipper job, and the layoff of two Shippers.
The dispute further narrows to the Company's primary assertion
that the parties bi-laterally agreed to the elimination of the
Shipper job and the transfer of some of its duties to the DCC
classification, and the Union's denial of any such agreement.
The weight of the credible evidence persuades me that in bilateral negotiations over the general question of according the
Company greater job flexibility, the Union impliedly, if not expressly agreed to the elimination of the Shipper classification
and the assignment of the disputed duties to the DCC classification.
First, the Union witnesses did not deny the Company's testimony that there were express discussions of a quid pro quo nature,
under which the Company agreed to establish two new truck driver
jobs in exchange for the elimination of the Shipper classification
The subsequent establishment of the two truck driver jobs is,
under traditional contract interpretation, affirmation and persuasive evidence of that "deal."

There is no logical explanation

for the creation of the two truck driver positions except as the
agreed to consideration for dropping the Shipper classification.
Additionally I find that though there is equivocal evidence
on whether the Company told the Union specifically that the
Shipper job would be eliminated, there is probative evidence of
duties which the DCC would encompass, and that among those specififed duties were some that had been performed by the Shipper.
From that the Union should have known either directly or constructively that the consequence of the DCC job would be to eliminate
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the Shipper, especially when it was clear that the obect of the
negotiations was to consolidate jobs and increase job assignment
flexibility.
Further determinative is the fact that the contract which the
Union signed following those negotiations did not include the
Shipper job among the listing of bargaining unit jobs, whereas
that job was listed in the predecessor contract.

If the parole

evidence rule of contract interpretation was applied, the Union
would be barred from attempting to impeach the written contract and
the absence therefrom of the Shipper classification, by evidence
of any prior oral agreements to the contrary.
cal approach is unnecessary.

But such a techni-

The contract has eliminated the

Shipper classification from the list of bargaining unit jobs; the
Union signed that contract; and the weight of the evidence of what
preceeded the preparation and execution of the contract points
convincingly to the conclusion that the parties agreed to the
elimination of the Shipper.

Hence the contract is confirmation

of that arrangement,
and explains why the Union signed it.
.

That

the Union thereafter reserved its right tocomplain to the NLRB
and/or to an arbitrator that the Shipper classification was improperly eliminated does not mean that the Union is excused from
the effect and responsibility of signing the contract; does not
change the evidence of what happened in the bi-lateral negotiations
and does not mean that the Company was wrong.

Rather it preserved

the right of the Union to bring on this arbitration proceeding
for a hearing and decision on the merits.

That right has now

been exercised and the respective contentions of the parties have
been adjudicated in this arbitration on the merits as presented.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Chairman of the
Board of Arbitration in the above matter, and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the above named parties, makes the
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following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the contract by
eliminating the Shipper job classification
and by assigning some of the Shipper duties
to the DCC.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Edward S. Danielski
Concurring

William Maier
Dissenting
DATED: October 7, 1985
STATE OF New York )sg
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
AAUP, University of Bridgeport
Chapter
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 39 0476 82

and
University of Bridgeport

The stipulated issue is:
Does the terminal contract of May 1, 1984 offered
to Mr. van der Giessen fulfill the intention of
the Arbitrator's Award? If not what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on June 25, 1985, at which Professor
van der Giessen, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant"
and representatives of the above named parties appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
filed post-hearing

The parties

statements.

My Award of February 7, 1984 held that the terminal notice
given the grievant by the University in May, 1981 violated the
contract.

I directed that he be reemployed by no later than the

beginning of the next academic year; that he be made whole for
net salary and benefits lost; and that the terminal notice be
expunged from his file.
The University re-employed him for the academic year 198485 (and presumably complied with the back pay and benefits
direction), but made his contract for the 1984-85 year another
"terminal contract."

The Union contends that the latter terminal

contract was violative of my Award, and that the grievant's reemployment should have been under a regular yearly contract,
according him an additional year thereafter (i.e. for the academic
year of 1985-86) if he was to receive another terminal notice.
I find no contract bar to the University's attempt to do
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correctly in 1984-85 what it did incorrectly by its May, 1981
notice.
The contract allows the University to give terminal contracts
or terminal notices for "institutional need."

The University's

error by its May 1981 notice was its failure to provide persuasive
reasons, or particularizations for and in support of its conclusionary "institutional need."

My Award had the effect of

transforming that earlier terminal contract into a regular contract, and gave the grievant the right to re-employment.

The

latter right of re-employment was not ordered or guaranteed for
any period of time beyond another academic year.

My Award did not

deal with whether the re-employment contract was to be a regular
contract, a terminal contract or based on any other conditions.
My Award was limited to expunging the May 1981 notice and prospectively, for the grievant's re-employment at the beginning of
the academic year following the Award.
The University retained its contract right to give terminal
contracts for "institutional need," and my Award did not prohibit
that or restrict that procedural right for the academic year of
the grievant's re-employment.
Accordingly the grievant's re-employment for the 1984-85
academic year, albeit with a terminal contract, complied with my
Award.

However this is not to say that the terminal contract for

the 1984-85 academic year was substantively proper.
is not before me.

That question

It is my view that the University must still

show persuasive reasons and justification for and in support of
its "institutional need," but that may be a matter for a subsequent arbitration, when and if the propriety of the University's
procedural right to issue a terminal contract is tested on the
merits.

The rights of the parties on this latter question are
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expressly reserved, and I observe that a grievance on that question
is presently pending.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above parties,
makes the following AWARD:
The terminal contract of May 1, 1984 offered
to Professor van der Giessen fulfilled the
intention of the Arbitrator's Award.

Eric y. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 30, 1985
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual describ ed in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

j

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Rockville Center CSEA

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1739-0188-85

and
Village of Rockville Center

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Village violated Article X Vacations,
in limiting the number of vacation days which
may be taken contiguous to weekends? If so,
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association in Garden City, New York on November 27, 1985 at
which time representatives of the Rockville Center CSEA, hereinafter referred to as the "Association" and the Village of
Rockville Center, hereinafter referred to as the "Village"

ap-

peared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Article X, Paragraph 5 of the contract reads:
"All vacation schedules are subject to the
approval of the Department Heads."
In the early summer of 1985, the Village Administrator
notified Department Heads that no more than five vacation days
could be scheduled and approved contiguous to weekends.

The

Village asserts that the policy is necessary to meet the Village's
operating and staffing needs on weekends and on the Fridays and
Mondays that respectively preceed and follow the weekend.

It is

undisputed that prior to this new policy, there was no limitation
on the scheduling of vacation days contiguous to weekends and
that Department Heads regularly approved any and all such schedules "subject to operating needs."

-2-

The Association asserts that the new policy is arbitrary
because it is rigidly and uniformly applicable to all weekends
and to all employees regardless of the particular operating or
staffing requirements of and for any particular weekend and the
days immediately preceeding and following that particular weekend.

The Association contends that any such absolute policy is

violative of the contractual provision permitting vacations to
be scheduled "subject to the approval of the Department Heads;"
that the policy strips the Department Heads of discretionary
authority; and that the policy sets up unilaterally, a new condi.ions that is not supported by the contract
or practice.,
, • -—•"-•
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I do not find the Village policy to be unreasonable or unrelated to operational needs.

The authority of Department Heads

referred to in Article X Paragraph 5, is not solely that of and/or
discretionary with the Department Head.

Clearly it relates to

the Villages' "managerial" authority to consider vacation schedules in the light of operating and staffing needs, and, though
exercised by and through Department Heads, may be determined and
set by the Village Administrator.

Therefore, the Administrator's

instructions to the Department Heads was a normal and traditional
implementation of managerial authority and did not improperly oust
the Department Heads of any

contractual authority or discretion.
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Had the Village promulgated the new policy without regard
for or study of the impact on operating and staffing needs by
vacations scheduled contiguous to weekends, I would agree with
the Association that the policy was arbitrary because it was not
prompted by or related to known factual conditions.

But that is

not the case here.
The Village offered unrefuted testimony that the governmental functions of the Village were in

fact hampered and in

some cases crippled, by the large number of employees, both bargaining unit and

supervisory, who scheduled vacation days con-

tiguous to weekends.

So, the Village has shown factual and real-

istic difficulties attendant to unrestricted vacation scheduling
and has demonstrated an operational basis and need for its new
policy.
Under that circumstance, I consider it appropriate and reasonable for the Village to believe that because Mondays and Fridays
are regularly "peak days"

the efficiency, essential services and

other functions of the Village would be regularly impaired if the
scheduling of vacation days contiguous to weekends was not limited,
Therefore, in view of the practice of approving vacation
schedules subject to operating needs, I find no contractual reason why the Village is required to make vacation application
decisions on a weekend by weekend basis.

The evidence in the

record persuasively points to a uniform and calendar-wide proble; and a uniform policy in response is proper.
Moreover, I find the policy to be reasonable in its dimensions.

In addition to the vacation days that may be scheduled

contiguous to weekends, the Village stated at the hearing that
the three "floating days" accorded the employees under the contract may

also be taken contiguous to weekends.

So as a prac-

tical matter, employees may schedule eight days off contiguous
to weekends.

And considering the vacation entitlement set forth

in Article X, Paragraph 1, which accords yearly vacations of ten,
fifteen, twenty-three and twenty-five working days to employees
respectively with five, ten, twenty and over twenty years service,
I do not find the scheduling restriction placed on five of those
days to be unfair or unreasonable under the circumstances of this
employment setting.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The Village did not violate Article X -Vacations- in limiting the number of vacation
days which may be taken contiguous to weekends .

DATED: December 14, 1985
STATE OF New York)ss .
COUNTY OF New York)

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

